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THE ATTORNEY AS DUELIST'S
FRIEND: LESSONS FROM THE CODE
DUELLO
Douglas H. Yarnt
I believe that nine duels out often, if not ninety-nine out of a hundre,
originate in the want of experience in the seconds.1
-John Lyde Wilson
[Tihere is not one case in fifty where discreet Seconds might not set-
tle the difference and reconcile the parties before they come to thefield. 2
-Abraham Bosquett
INTRODUCTION
Could it be that nine trials out of ten, if not ninety-nine out of a
hundred, originate in the want of experience in the attorneys? Could
it be that there is not one lawsuit in fifty where discreet attorneys
might not settle the difference and reconcile the parties before com-
mencing litigation? Attorneys are agents of disputing, pursuing
resolution of their clients' disputes either by legal judgment or nego-
tiated settlement. In the course of this pursuit, they are increasingly
called upon to function in non-adjudicative forums as peacemakers
while simultaneously maintaining the role of advocate.
t Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University, and Executive Director of the
Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution. This Article evolved from a paper pre-
sented in a panel presentation on Ethics of the Attorney-Representative in Mediation at the 1999
Annual Meeting of the Dispute Resolution Section of the American Bar Association. The
author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Robert Coursey and the constructive
comments and encouragement of faculty colleagues.
I JOHN LYDE WILSON, THE CODE OF HONOR: OR RuLEs FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
PRINCIPALS AND SECONDS IN DUELUNG 10 (Charleston, S.C., James Phinney 1858) [hereinafter
WILSON CODE]. Citations are to the more common second edition rather than the first published
in Charleston by Thomas J. Eccles in 1838. Wilson, a former governor of South Carolina, was a
noted duelist and died of natural causes soon after authoring this tract. Subsequent anonymous
editors added diatribes against Northern states to the posthumous 2d, 3d, and 4th editions.
2 ABRAHAM BosQuErr, THE YOUNG MAN OF HONOUR'S VADE-MECUM 16 (London, C.
Chapple 1817). The general tone of the WILSON CODE seems influenced by Bosquett's work.
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Assuming that attorneys should and could do a better job pre-
venting litigation and negotiating settlement of their clients' disputes,
this Article posits that one of the reasons attorneys perform poorly as
peacemakers is not merely from "want of experience" but from want
of a functional role model that strikes an appropriate balance between
the seemingly contradictory activities of being both a peacemaker and
an advocate, of having to cooperate and compete at the same time.
3
Ironically, a role model can be found in the formalities of duel-
ing. After considering the necessity for such a model, this Article
exhumes the roles of "friends" or "seconds" under early nineteenth-
century dueling codes and illustrates their use in the context of several
documented American duels. It examines how this historical model
of the duelist's friend 4 offers modem attorneys a model of civility and
a pattern of behavior that promote constructive dispute resolution
without necessarily compromising the client's interests.
I. THE NEED FOR A MODEL: THE TENSION BETWEEN ZEALOUS
ADVOCACY AND PEACEMAKING
Attorneys are asked to perform two different functions in the
resolution of civil disputes. On one hand, they are expected to be
zealous advocates-competitive, tough, and uncompromising in pur-
suit of their clients' interests in an adjudicative forum. On the other
hand, they are expected to be peacemakers--civil, cooperative, and
conciliatory when pursuing their clients' interests through settlement
in a non-adjudicative forum.5 The tension between these functions
centers around the problem of zealous behavior in advocacy.
Zealous advocacy has its roots in the concept of zeal as an aspect
of client loyalty and is traceable back to the mid-nineteenth century in
American lawyering.6  The rationalization for zealous advocacy is
3 For purposes of this Article, "peacemaking" includes negotiated settlement of a legal
dispute, which requires some level of cooperation to achieve. "Advocacy" connotes representa-
tion in an adversary system for adjudicated resolution of a legal dispute and tends to invoke a
high degree of competition. The choice between cooperative and competitive behaviors is a
complex matter involving many variables. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation,
94 COLUM. L. REv. 509 (1994) (discussing the role of lawyers and their degree of cooperation
within the context of game-theory models). This Article focuses on the problem of attorneys
having responsibilities in both roles, not when they choose one role over the other.
4 The idea of lawyer serving as friend is not new. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as
Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
5 See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Legal Profession and the Public Image of Lawyers, 23 J.
LEGAL PROF. 51, 52 (1998-1999) ("Society places a dual role on lawyers-in the popular cul-
ture lawyers are expected to be tough[,] ... but lawyers are simultaneously expected to be a
friend, gentle and kind .... ").
6 See CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 578 n.73 (1986); Ray Paterson,
Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY LJ. 909 (1980). The standard con-
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that it is necessary for a functional adversary method of adjudicative
dispute resolution. The organized bar deemed it a virtue of lawyer-
ing by incorporating the concept into its first set of ethical standards.8
In addition to being embodied in the ethical standards of the profes-
sion, zealous advocacy is taught in law schools, permeates legal
pedagogy, and is reinforced by legal institutions and the media.
But the question arises: What is the acceptable degree of zealous
behavior? The concept can be abused when used to justify the ex-
tremely hostile, hyper-competitive adversary behavior commonly
caricatured as the "Rambo litigator."9 In this extreme form, the zeal-
ous advocate stops at nothing in dogged pursuit of victory for the cli-
ent. Such a lawyer does not necessarily violate the law and ethical
standards but simply seeks to win regardless of the economic and
non-economic costs. Additionally, the zealous advocate ignores ci-
vility or violates non-obligatory professional norms requiring com-
promise or concessions or that imply weakness in the client's cause.'0
ception of zealous advocacy as unaccountable partisanship was strongly influenced by Lord
Brougham's statement in defense of his spirited representation of Queen Caroline:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at
all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first and
only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments,
the destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot
from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it should
be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.
2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (New York, James Cockroft & Co. 1874).
7 See WOLFRAM, supra note 6, at 563-92 (analyzing the appropriate role of lawyers in the
U.S. system of justice). See generally DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY (1988) (discussing that morality requires lawyers to zealously represent their clients).
8 This duty was included in the first set of ethical standards adopted by the American Bar
Association ("ABA") in 1908. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1969) ('Ihe
lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and de-
fense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability .... ) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The CANONS were superceded by the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY, which expressly retained the concept of zeal: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client
Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Canon 7 (1983).
The MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT were adopted in 1983 and also call for
"zeal in advocacy." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1999). In
addition, the Preamble provides that "[a]s advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's posi-
tion under the rules of the adversary system." Id. Preamble.
9 Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Eth-
ics, 17 PEPP. L REv. 637, 642-46 (1990) (discussing reasons for nasty tactics by trial lawyers).
See Robert N. Saylor, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don't Work, A.B.A. J., Mar.
1988, at 79, for an example of the issue as discussed in professional journals; for an example in
the popular press, see Saundra Torry, Rambo Litigation and a Rash of Rudeness, WASH. POST,
July 20, 1992, at F5.
'0 See Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigm and Possibility, 50 SMU L
REV. 433 (1997) (referring to this type of lawyer as the "victorious lawyer").
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Although an attorney's duty to a client includes some level of
zealous advocacy, unbridled zeal has never been condoned by the
ethical standards. At a minimum, representational conduct must be
within legal boundaries so as not to undermine the adversary system
that justifies the behavior.11 In addition, the various standards of con-
duct attempt to balance zeal with the attorney's own conscience and
with consideration for the other side and fellow members of the pro-
fession. 12 Although staying within the bounds of legal conduct is a
relatively clear and enforceable limitation, there is less clarity in lim-
its to zealous behavior based on individual conscience and courtesy.
Such limitations are necessarily more aspirational and are notable as
being honored in the breach by the stereotypical Rambo litigator.
In an effort to limit possible abuses made under the guise of
permissible zeal, members of the bench and bar founded the profes-
sionalism or civility movement. 13 Although generally concerned with
a perceived erosion in the ideals of the legal profession, 14 the profes-
sionalism movement believes that the standard of zealous advocacy is
often used as an excuse for incivility. As an antidote, it stresses the
importance of courteous and moral behavior, which by definition is
partly dependent on the individual attorney's enlightened conscience.
Because the professionalism movement traces the problems of the
profession to unbridled adversarial behavior, proponents of profes-
sionalism and of zealous advocacy are directly at odds.15 Regardless
" See sources cited supra note 8.
12 Normative statements supporting such behavior are found in the various ethical stan-
dards, often as a direct counter-balance to zealous advocacy. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS Canon 14 (1969) (requiring a lawyer to restrain unbridled zeal by "[obeying] his own
conscience and not that of his client"); id. Canon 24 (discouraging lawyers from seeking every
tactical advantage in incidental matters before trial and noting that "no client has a right to de-
mand that his counsel shall be illiberal, or that he do anything therein repugnant to his own
sense of honor and propriety"). The same concepts can be found in the more current standards;
because of the difficulty in enforcing such norms, however, they are relegated to ethical consid-
erations and comments. See e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Preamble (1999)
("[A] lawyer is also guided by personal conscience .... ").
,3 See Marvin E. Aspen, A Response to the Civility Naysayers, 28 STETSON L. REv. 253
(1998) (arguing that the duty of zealous advocacy cannot override the duty of professionalism);
Marvin E. Aspen, Let Us Be "Officers of the Court", A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 94, 95-96 (same).
14 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994) (reviewing the effects
of the loss of professionalism); SOL M. LINowrrz WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED
PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTuRY (1994) (tracing the loss of
professionalism).
15 Proponents of zealous advocacy view the professionalism movement with suspicion.
They argue that professionalism standards can be abused by judges and have the potential to
undermine the proper functioning of the adversary system. See Monroe H. Freedman, The
Ethical Danger of "Civility" and "Professionalism," CRIM. JUST. J., Spring 1998, at 17-19
(accusing the professionalism movement of being one of the most serious attacks on the ethic of
zeal). See also Monroe Freedman, Civility Runs Amok, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 1995, at 54
(arguing that judicial interpretation and application of civility codes are problematic when
[Vol. 51:69
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of its merits and despite its critics, 16 the professionalism movement
questions competitive behaviors associated with zeal and calls for
more cooperative behaviors as a counterbalance. In so doing, it con-
tributes to the role dissonance of attorneys by pitting one conception
of behavior against another.
Another legal reform movement, alternative dispute resolution
("ADR"), contrasts the role of the peacemaker with that of the zeal-
ous advocate, generally promoting the former and disparaging the
latter.17 The idea of the lawyer as peacemaker is nothing new18 and
has been associated with the role of counseling under the professional
norms. 19 The ADR movement places a premium on the role of
judges value courtesy to other lawyers above "entire devotion to the interests of the client [and]
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights").
16 Other critics of the professionalism movement reject the "myth" of a golden age when
lawyers were generally respected and law was an honored profession. See Marc Galanter, Law-
yers in the Mist: The Golden Ageof Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. REV. 549 (1996); Kathleen
P. Browne, Comment, A Critique of the Civility Movement: Why Rambo Will Not Go Away, 77
MARQ. L REV. 751 (1994).
17 See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Clients, and Mediation, 73 NOTRE DAME L
REV. 1369 (1998) (arguing that zealous advocacy as currently understood is incompatible with
good representation in ADR); but see Craig McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging
the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L REV. 1317
(1995) (asserting that lawyers who are active participants in ADR benefit the process).
18 Famous lawyers throughout the ages have meditated on the relationship of lawyers to
peacemaking. Abraham Lincoln advised:
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you
can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often the true loser-in fees, ex-
penses, and waste of time. As a peace-maker, the lawyer has a superior opportunity
of being a good man. There will still be business enough.
Never stir up litigation. A worse man can scarcely be found than one who does
this.
Abraham Lincoln, Notes for a Law Lecture, in 2 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
140, 142 (n.p., Lincoln Memorial Univ. 1894).
Confucius reflected the traditional Chinese attitude towards litigation: "The master said,
I could try a civil suit as well as anyone. But better still to bring it about that there were no civil
suits!" THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIOUS 167 (Arthur Waley trans., Vintage Books, 1989)
(1938).
Similarly, Gandhi said:
I realized that the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties .... [A] large part
of my time during the twenty years of my practice as a lawyer was occupied in
bringing about private compromises of hundreds of cases. I lost nothing thereby-
not even money, certainly not my soul.
M. K. GANDHI, GANDH'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH
168 (Mahadev Desai trans., Public Affairs Press 1948).
19 See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICs Canon 8 (1969) ("Whenever the controversy
will admit of fair adjustment, the client should be advised to avoid or end the litigation.").
Current norms seem to discount the role of counselor. See MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rules 2.1-.3 (1999) (recognizing, almost begrudgingly, the role of coun-
selor-limiting it to a subtitle under which three rules, 2.1 (advisor), 2.2 (intermediary), and 2.3
(evaluation for use by third persons), are organized). Commentators quickly recognized that the
prevailing professional standards focused largely on the role of advocate to the detriment of the
counseling role. See E. Wayne Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEX. L REV.
575, 578-79 (1961) (expressing the need to reappraise the CANONS in light of the distinct func-
tion of counselor); see also Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44
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peacemaker by successfully institutionalizing processes of dispute
resolution that emphasize negotiated settlement over adversarial adju-
dication. Today in most federal and state courts,20 litigants are re-
quired to participate in some form of ADR process before trial. 21
Arguably, these institutional reforms have so changed the dispute
resolution system that a new paradigm of lawyering is required.22 As
representatives in ADR processes,23 attorneys have to consider
whether their behavior facilitates or impedes achievement of their
clients' objectives. There are some aspects of the standards which in
an ADR-infused legal environment compel attorneys to consider their
role as peacemakers when counseling24 and when representing; 25
A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958) (noting that partisan behaviors are acceptable in trial but not neces-
sarily acceptable when counseling).
Regarding trends in the profession undermining the counseling role, see ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993) (bemoaning the demise of the "lawyer-statesman").
20 See, e.g., Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 StaL
2993 (establishing ADR in the federal courts); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 484.74 (West 1990) (estab-
lishing power of state courts to refer parties to ADR).
21 ADR processes ordered by a court can include, but are not limited to, negotiation, set-
tlement conference, mediation, early neutral evaluation, case evaluation, mandatory non-binding
arbitration, and use of a discovery referee. See generally DOUGLAS H. YARN, DICTIONARY OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1999), for definitions of these and other court-related ADR processes.
22 See Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, Lawyering for a New Age (April 8, 1998), in 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1998) (positing that societal changes and changes in the courts, particu-
larly the introduction of court-connected ADR and client-driven ADR, are creating pressures for
a new type of problem-solving lawyering and reducing the demand for or relevance of the
Rambo litigator).
23 In addition to serving as representatives in these negotiations, lawyers are quickly
claiming a new peacemaking role as mediators and third-party interveners. The ABA's current
effort to revise the ethical standards, known as "Ethics 2000," has recommended recognition of
this new role in a revision to the MODEL RULES. See ABA Ethics 2000 Website (visited Sept.
13,2000) <http:llwww/abanet.orglyld/ethics/welcomelhtml>.
24 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1983) (prohibiting
representation in a legal matter for which the lawyer is not competent or prepared); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1999) (requiring the lawyer to be competent and
prepared). With the widespread institutionalization of ADR processes made available or man-
dated by courts or statutes, a lawyer could not provide competent counsel without advising the
client about the ADR processes available or mandated. Requirements to consult with clients
regarding the means of pursuing their objectives and to explain matters to the extent necessary
for the client to make informed decisions probably already required lawyers to inform clients of
ADR. See id. Rule 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall.., consult with the client as to the means by which
[the objectives of representation] are to be pursued."); id. Rule 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions re-
garding representation."). See also R. Cochran, Must Lawyers Tell Clients About Alternative
Dispute Resolution?, 48 ARB. J., June 1993, at 8 (discussing the effect of ethical requirements
on counseling clients about ADR).
The ethical standards in some states have been modified to address the problem of
counseling in ADR. See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. r. 3-107, EC 7-5 (1993) ("A lawyer as
advisor has a duty to advise the client as to various forms of dispute resolution. When a matter
is likely to involve litigation, a lawyer has a duty to inform the client of forms of dispute resolu-
tion which might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation.").
When the ethical consideration is stated in the imperative, the failure to counsel would
probably not lead to discipline by the bar; the ethical consideration may be used as evidence,
however, in a legal malpractice action. See Allen v. Letkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C.,
[Vol. 51:69
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however, the professional standards can be criticized as being formu-
lated for lawyers to function as zealous advocates within the context
of traditional, adversary adjudication and provide little or no guidance
on how to behave in ADR.26 Proponents of ADR are concerned that
without such guidance, attorneys will engage in adversary behaviors
that undermine the peacemaking function.27 Thus, like professional-
ism, the ADR movement questions the appropriateness of some be-
haviors associated with zealous advocacy and promotes cooperative
peacemaking as a counterbalance.
Although the civility issues in professionalism have focused
more on abusive litigation tactics than on the problems of settlement,
453 S.E.2d 719 (Ga. 1995) (holding that while a bar rule is not conclusive, it is relevant to the
standard of care in a malpractice case); see also Thomas v. White, 438 S.E.2d 366 (Ga. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that an attorney who fails to properly counsel a client regarding the effect of
court-annexed ADR is potentially liable, punitive damages included, for malpractice).
2 In a representative role, the attorney could not be competent without having some level
of representational skill as well as knowledge of the ADR process in use. If these skills differ
from those required in formal adjudication, the attorney must have competence in the appropri-
ate skills. It is important to note that competent representation includes adequate preparation.
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmrY DR 6-101(A)(2) (1983) (prohibiting
representation in a legal matter without adequate preparation); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr Rule 1.1 (1999) (requiring competent representation, that is, "the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation").
Query whether failure to participate in a settlement process, such as mediation, is mal-
practice. See Robert F. Cochran, Suing Lawyers Who Sue, 11 CAL. LAW., Apr. 1991, at 120
(suggesting that litigators should be liable for malpractice if they do not first offer mediation to
clients).
2 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407
(1997) (discussing issues raised in ADR practices today and the need to develop ethical stan-
dards); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics of ADR Representation: A Road Map of Critical Issues,
DISp. RESOL MAO., Winter 1997, at 3-6 (same).
27 See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation Requested, Recommended, or
Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L REv. 575 (1997); sources cited supra note 26.
One view is that an adversarial and competitive strategy is a lawyer's only choice, thus
the standard lawyer negotiation paradigm of adversarial positional bargaining relying on and
fostering deception and misrepresentation, usually in the form of "bluffing" and "puffing" to
inflate the strengths of a client's position and protect the "bottom line" from revelation. The
MODEL RULES accept this state of affairs as the norm. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDuCr Rule 4.1 cmt. 2 (1999) (prohibiting knowingly making false statements of material
fact, but, "under generally accepted conventions in negotiation" certain statements are not
statements of material fact). See also James J. 'White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limita-
tions on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926 (1980) (discussing the issue of
truthfulness within the context of Rule 4.2 of the MODEL RULES).
A contrary view is that a lawyer should be held to a higher standard of behavior when
acting as a counselor or attorney in negotiations than when acting as an advocate in court be-
cause the absence of an umpire requires more self-restraint. See Murray L Schwartz, The Pro-
fessionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 685 (1978) (proposing a
professional rule for a non-advocate attorney). According to one of the more influential theo-
rists in negotiation, the integrative, problem-solving, or principled strategies of negotiation
create less of the same ethical and moral tensions that underlie competitive strategy. See Roger
Fisher, A Code of Negotiation Practices for Lawyers, 1 NEGOTIATION J. 105 (1985) (outlining a
detailed code for lawyers to follow in a negotiation to limit ethical problems).
20001
CASE WESTERN RESERVE L4W REVIEW
the professionalism and ADR movements overlap, sometimes dra-
matically,28 to highlight the relationship between incivility and im-
pediments to settlement. Influential members of the bench have si-
multaneously promoted both causes.29 ADR is an escape from the
incivility in litigation, 30 and Rambo litigation is incompatible with
compromise and settlement, merely adding to the client's costs.31
Effective adversary behavior in an ADR forum may simply be coun-
terproductive.32 Proponents of ADR have expressed their concern
2 In Georgia, for example, the 'Lawyer's Creed" counsels: "To the opposing parties and
their counsel, I offer fairness, integrity, and civility. I will seek reconciliation and, if we fail, I
will strive to make our dispute a dignified one." GA. COMP. R. & REG. Part IX, A Lawyer's
Creed, app. (2000).
Other aspirational ideals of professional behavior in Georgia emphasize a constructive
role for attorneys in ADR processes. This is confirmed by the following professional aspira-
tions:
As a lawyer, I will aspire:
(b) To model for others, and particularly for my clients, the respect due to those we
call upon to resolve our disputes and the regard due to all participants in our dispute
resolution processes.
(d) To preserve and improve the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution
processes as instruments for the common good.
(e) To make the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes avail-
able to all.
Id. at Part IX, General Aspirational Ideals. The aspirations continue: "As to clients, I will
aspire... (b) To fully informed client decision-making. As a professional, I should: (1)
Counsel clients about all forms of dispute resolution; [and] (2) Counsel clients about the
value of cooperation as a means towards the productive resolution of disputes; ... ." IL at
Part IX, Specific Aspirational Ideals.
The Georgia State Bar established a commission to identify, enunciate, and encourage
adherence to non-mandatory, aspirational standards of professional conduct that are higher than
those required by the ABA models. See id. at r. 9-102.
29 For example, former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger was an early proponent of the
modem professionalism movement as well as the modem ADR movement. See Warren E.
Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211 (1971) ("[Flew subjects could be more rele-
vant to discuss than the necessity for civility in the resolution of litigation in a civilized soci-
ety."); Warren E. Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982) (discussing the
ADR movement). On a state level, former Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court, Harold
Clarke, formed both the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism and a Commission on
Dispute Resolution during his tenure.
30 See Thomas Gibbs Gee & Bryan A. Garner, The Uncivil Lawyer: A Scourge at the Bar,
15 Rav. LrriG. 177, 195 (1996) (arguing that the rise of ADR is a partial antidote to the incivil-
ity related to modem litigation).
31 See Reavley, supra note 9, at 642-46 (noting that Rambo tactics are inappropriate and
of no advantage in a mediated settlement discussion and arguing that the problem of civility in
litigation is not new). Although lay people often think that the best lawyer is the toughest and
the meanest lawyer, the combat mode of advocacy is far more expensive than effective for the
client. See id.; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture:
A Tale ofInnovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1991) (point-
ing out that the adversary system itself may be incompatible with some of the fundamental
principles of ADR). See Evanoff v. Evanoff, 418 S.E.2d 62 (Ga. 1992), for a discussion on how
the ideals of professionalism affect settlement negotiations.
32 See generally Symposium, Teaching a New Paradigm: Must Knights Shed Their
Swords and Armor to Enter Certain ADR Arenas?, CARDoZo ONLINE J. DiSP. RESOL (visited
[Vol. 51:69
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with adversarial behavior by attorneys in mediation and have called
for revisions to ethical standards in order to control such behaviors.33
Together, these movements envision a behavioral model that contrasts
with the hyper-competitive and uncooperative behavior of zealous
advocacy. The peacemaker engages in objective problem-solving,
wisely counseling clients to avoid exacerbating conflicts and to ex-
plore reconciliation. Such a lawyer is sensitive to the drawbacks of
adversarial adjudication and seeks an outcome that is less destructive
to human relationships while stressing civility, compromise, coopera-
tion, and mutual respect.
Zealous advocacy, professionalism, and ADR combine to con-
front the attorney with a seemingly irreconcilable set of contradictory
models for behavior.34 These models appear irreconcilable to such an
extent that some commentators believe effective litigation and settle-
ment require a different set of skills and thus that a single lawyer can-
not simultaneously apply these skills and effectively balance the roles
of litigator and conciliator.3 5  They argue that the combination of
Mar. 8, 1999) <http.//www.cardozo.yu.edu/cojcr/conresympl.html> (exploring whether lawyers
and law students must understand a different vision of lawyering, which incorporates a new set
of skills to engage in negotiation and mediation, or whether they can use the adversarial mind-
set and combative techniques taught in traditional law school curriculum).
33 See sources cited supra notes 26-27.
34 See William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL 367, 376-82 (1999) (identifying five role models of lawyers in dispute resolution-the
Champion, the Hired Gun, the Litigator (using litigation as a weapon to force settlement), the
Healer, and the Problem-solver).
The "problem-solver" is an increasingly popular role model as evidenced by the Har-
vard Law School's "The Lawyer as Problem Solver: A Symposium on Dispute Resolution and
Legal Practice," April 7-8, 2000, and Syracuse University College of Law 1999-2000 Lecture
Series on "Lawyer as Problem Solver." There is a law school-based center, the William J.
McGill Center for Creative Problem Solving at the California Western School of Law, which
sponsored a recent conference, entitled "The Lawyer as Creative Problem Solver," Feb. 24-26,
2000, San Diego, California.
This "problem-solver" concept has been popularized by numerous scholars. See, e.g.,
Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problem
Solvers, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1995) (arguing that law schools need to start teaching
people to be counselors, problem-solvers, and negotiators); Alan M. Lerner, Law and Lawyering
in the Workplace: Building Better Lawyers by Teaching Students to Exercise Critical Judgment
as Creative Problem Solvers, 32 AKRON L REv. 107 (1999) (suggesting a plan to teach prob-
lem-solving techniques to first-year law students); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another
View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984)
(criticizing the adversarial approach to legal negotiation and suggesting a "problem-solving"
model). Compare Janet Reno, Lawyers as Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, 49
J. LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1999) (challenging law schools to shift their paradigms to include problem-
solving approaches) with Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving Seriously: A Re-
sponse to the Attorney General, 49 J. LEGAL EDuc. 14 (1999) (suggesting concrete ways in
which law schools could respond to the challenge of incorporating problem-solving ap-
proaches).
3 See Coyne supra note 34, at 367-69. See also Gary Mendelsohn, Note, Lawyers As
Negotiators, 1 HARv. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 139 (1996) (arguing that the traditional adversary
system in which lawyers litigate and negotiate tends to promote stalemates).
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mental dissonance 36 and perverse incentives 37 make litigators poor
negotiators and negotiators poor litigators. Instead, they suggest that
the roles be assigned to separate legal counsel, each party having two
attorneys, one to serve as settlement counsel and the other to liti-
gate.38 Unfortunately, the added cost of additional counsel and other
impediments, including reliance on the other side agreeing to also use
settlement counsel, will limit widespread use of dual representation.39
A variation of the settlement counsel approach is "collaborative
lawyering."4 Under this model, the parties and their respective law-
3 See Coyne, supra note 34, at 369 (noting that "it is extremely difficult, psychologically,
for an attorney to act as an effective advocate and, at the same time, to encourage settlement");
Mendelsohn, supra note 35, at 146 (noting that the zealous advocacy model promotes a win/lose
mentality that values competition over cooperation, and that the lawyerly focus on the adversary
system undermines creativity and reinforces psychological bias that inhibits settlement) (citing
Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 570,582-83
(1983)).
37 See Mendelsohn, supra note 35, at 140-43 (noting that the financial incentives for an
attorney working at an hourly rate create incentives for an attorney to extend the work to collect
greater fees rather than to settle) (citing Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settle-
ment, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 203 (1987)). Non-financial incentives include an attorney's
concern over reputation as a tough litigator or that litigating a case will advance her career more
than settlement would. See id. at 141. Both financial and non-financial incentives can work
either for or against settlement, but the motivation is often unrelated to the clients' best interest.
See id. at 143.
Coyne believes that attorneys are, for the most part, reacting rationally to existing in-
centives and expectations. See Coyne, supra note 34, at 369. He lists the following incentives:
the need to market services, the desire not to appear weak, the obligation to represent clients
zealously, the thirst for justice, and the desire to maximize income. See id. These societal and
structural incentives, including financial and psychological factors and the way in which society
pictures the lawyers role, work against early settlement. See id. at 376.
38 See Coyne, supra note 34, at 392-93 ('The pressure to be a Champion, or a Hired Gun,
or a Litigator is reduced so that the problem-solving can take place."); Mendelsohn, supra note
35, at 148-66 (arguing that a pure negotiator has advantages over a litigator in overcoming cer-
tain barriers to settlement). This idea was originally articulated by Professor Roger Fisher. See
Roger Fisher, What About Negotiation as a Specialty?, 69 A.B.A. J. 1221, 1221 (1983) (sug-
gesting that negotiation should be a field of specialty in the law). See also Roger Fisher, He
Who Pays the Piper, HARV. Bus. REV. Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 150, 155-57 (presenting a "letter" to
counsel suggesting that it is in everyone's interest to settle cases and that trial should be the
option of last resort). There is also the notion that attorneys, even if devoted as settlement coun-
sel, simply cannot be as effective as mediators. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We
Need a Mediator For?" Value-Added for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISp. RESOL 1, 36
(1996) (describing empowerment-and-recognitive centered mediation).
39 See Mendelsohn, supra note 35, at 166-67 n.93 (noting the disadvantage of increased
costs under the settlement counsel model and the problem arising from the other side refusing to
use the model and hire a separate negotiator as well). Mendelsohn admits that if the client can
find the "rare lawyer who is skilled in both litigation and negotiation, can shift between the two
skills with ease, and keeps only her client's best interest in mind.., the client can do no better
than to stick with that one attorney." Id. See also Coyne, supra note 34, at 404-08 (noting that
opposing parties are an obstacle to using problem-solving methods to the fullest extent).
40 See generally D. Todd Sholar, Collaborative Law-A Method for the Madness, 23
MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 667 (1993) (contrasting the collaborative law model and mediation and
discussing the model in light of the ABA models); William van Zyverden, Collaborative Law-
Moving Settlement Toward Resolution, 20 VT. B. J. & L. DIG. 35 (1994) (discussing the various
aspects of collaborative law and settlement in a succinct manner).
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yers commit to seek a resolution without court intervention. Used
primarily in divorce cases, the attorneys and clients sign an agreement
in which all the participants commit to open and constructive settle-
ment negotiations. If a party breaks the rules (withholds information
or hires a detective to spy on the other spouse), refuses the attorney's
advice, or decides to pursue litigation, the collaborative lawyers will
withdraw from representation, and their clients must engage litigation
counsel.41 As in the settlement counsel model, there are serious im-
pediments to a widespread acceptance of the collaborative lawyering
model. Attorneys can enter into collaborative lawyering agreements
only with attorneys known to be active practitioners of the model.
Because collaborative lawyers are committed to withdraw if the mat-
ter requires litigation, there are questions as to whether a collaborative
lawyer can meet a duty of zealous advocacy while simultaneously
refusing to litigate.42 Other objections to collaborative lawyering are
derived from this commitment to resign in the face of litigation.
4 3
The presumption that the advocacy and peacemaking roles are
mutually exclusive, requiring separate lawyers to perform separate
functions, is supported by data indicating that the psychological and
physiological profiles of individual lawyers make them better-suited
for one role over another.44 Nevertheless, lawyers may feel com-
pelled to choose one role over the other simply to avoid the psycho-
logical toll of mentally and emotionally sustaining both.45
Although not insisting that the skills are mutually exclusive,
other commentators have argued that it is to a client's advantage for
lawyers on both sides of a dispute to help their clients commit to and
41 Although this approach purportedly eliminates the need for a separate mediator, other
lawyers committed to the collaborative lawyering model can consult or intervene as mediators
upon request. See Robert w. Rack, Settle or Withdraw: Collaborative Law Provides Incentive
to Avoid Costly Litigation, 4 Dism. RESOL MAG., Summer 1998, at 8.
42 See id. at 9 (dispelling presence of an ethical problem if the client understands and
agrees to the collaborative lawyer's role).
4 See id. (discussing problems associated with collaborative law model breakdown, in-
cluding costs of educating new counsel, compensating resigned collaborative lawyer, the need
for interim relief, abuse of the process for discovery, and whether the process will work if op-
posing party is not represented by a collaborative lawyer).
44 See Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change?
A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived
Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEo. L LEGAL ETHics 547,593 (1998) (noting that there are
empirically-demonstrated lawyer attributes that would have to change to make lawyers happier
and more efficient); Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself. A Review of Empirical Research on
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L REV. 1337 (1997) (discussing
lawyer attributes which would have to be changed to allow lawyers to fulfill both advocacy and
peacemaking roles).
45 See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 52 ("[T]hese self-contradictory expectations lead lawyers
to be depressed.").
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pursue cooperative, instead of combative, strategies in litigation.46
Under this approach, developing and maintaining a reputation as a
cooperative lawyer who works with other cooperative lawyers is
valuable to clients. This approach is similar to the collaborative
model discussed above and suffers from the same limitations. It
works only if both sides are committed to cooperation and neither
side defects into combative behavior. This model does not require
two attorneys for each client, one cooperative and one combative, and
withdrawal is not required if the matter goes to litigation. As a prac-
tical matter, however, the cooperative attorney would be pressured to
withdraw in the face of combative behavior by the client or the other
side, simply in order to preserve his or her cooperative reputation.
Finally, even if the skills are not mutually exclusive, it can be
difficult to distinguish whether, in any given situation, one should be
functioning as a zealous advocate or as a peacemaker. Arguably,
zealous advocacy is limited to times when the attorney is representing
a party in an adversarial forum.47 If, however, the attorney sees no
clear demarcation between adversarial and non-adversarial fora for
resolution of the dispute, or believes that zealous advocacy outside
the adversarial forum is necessary to preserve his client's cause
within that forum, the attorney is likely to persist in the behavior.
Assuming that disputants are best served by having both a zeal-
ous advocate and a peacemaker and that attempts to circumvent the
problem of reconciling the competing models are unsatisfactory, the
conduct of seconds in dueling merits some consideration.
II. A MODEL: THE CONDUCT OF SECONDS UNDER CODE DUELLOS
A. A Brief History of Dueling
Duels are "set fights" taking place under prescribed conditions.48
While analogs of dueling can be found in most societies,49 the modern
46 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 3, at 514-29 (suggesting that litigation can be
viewed as a repeated prisoners' dilemma game using the standard game-theory terms "cooper-
ate" and "defect").
47 In the most current model standards, zeal is mentioned only in the context of advocacy.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1999) ("A lawyer should act.
. . with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."); i& Preamble, para. 2 (discussing many
representational roles but mentioning zeal only when "asserting the client's position under the
rules of the adversary system."). In its strict legal sense, an advocate is someone who represents
another in the courts. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 80 (1963) (noting
that "advocate" is derived from the Roman advocatus-a pleader in the church courts).
48 See V. G. KIERNAN, THE DUEL IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 20 (1988) (describing various
traditions held in ancient societies).
The Italian word, duello, may be a contraction of the Latin terms for "two" (duo) and
"war" (bellum). See DON C. SErTz, FAMOUS AMERICAN DUELS 1 (Books for Libraries Press
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conception of dueling-stylized combat between two individuals to
resolve a matter of honor--evolved in Europe from forms of trial by
ordeal or judgment by God. The trial by ordeal involved a physical
test, such as retrieving an object from a vat of boiling water-the ac-
cused, by surviving unscathed, established his or her innocence or
truthfuilness. The oath, which is closely related to trials by ordeal, is
simply a more abstract form of divine judgment and remains in wide-
spread use in legal institutions.51 Applying the same logic, a combat-
ant in trial by combat proves his cause by surviving. In medieval
feudal society, sovereigns presided over public trials by combat or
"judicial duels" between disputing nobility and would declare the
winner.52 In the early sixteenth century, Italian nobility drew upon
this tradition, which was then in considerable decline, and established
"extra-judicial duels"-private trials by combat-as a method of re-
solving disputes over personal affronts. 3 Other European nobility
quickly adopted dueling, which flourished in various segments of
European society from the sixteenth to early twentieth centuries. 4
1966) (1929). Billacois traces the use of "duello" to refer to single combat in France at the
beginning of the seventeenth century. See FRANCOIS BiLLACOIS, THE DUEL: ITS RISE AND
FALL IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 5-6 (Trista Jelous ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 1990) (1986)
(defining "duel" as "a fight between two or several individuals (but always with equal numbers
on either side), equally armed, for the purpose of proving either the truth of a disputed question
or the valour, courage and honour of each combatant").
49 See KIERNAN, supra note 48, at 19-30 (summarizing dueling in classical, pre-modem,
and non-Western societies).
50 See BILLAcOIs, supra note 48, at 15.
51 See SIR FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 596-99 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1895).
52 See generally ROBERT BALDICK, THE DUEL: A HISTORY OF DUELING 11-21 (1965)
(distinguishing between judicial duels, single combat by champions, and warring armies in
which the combatants, as part of a larger unit, bore each other no personal animosity). See also
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *337 (characterizing trial by wager of battel as of
great antiquity); 3 LORD COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *453 (providing a
more archaic description of trial by combat).
53 See generally FREDERICK R. BRYSON, THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ITALIAN DUEL
(1938) (discussing dueling and its various uses in Italy during the sixteenth century).
5 See KIERNAN supra note 48, at 68-91 (detailing the spread of dueling across Europe,
from England to Romania). See generally BEN C. TRUMAN, THE FIELD OF HONOR: A
COMPLETE AND COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF DUELLING IN ALL COUNTRIES (New York,
Fords, Howard & Hubbert 1884) (providing a less scholarly and slightly more romanticized
perspective on dueling history).
The French quickly adopted the practice of dueling from the Italians. French nobility
attended Italian fencing schools to better prepare themselves, but the practice died out in the
early eighteenth century. See BILLACOIS, supra note 48, at 18-20. Dueling enjoyed a brief
revival in the nineteenth century until the early twentieth century, particularly-among university
students and the officer corps in France and Germany. See generally UTE FREVERT, MEN OF
HONOUR: A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE DUEL (Anthony Williams trans., Polity
Press 1995) (1991) (providing a history of dueling in France and Germany); KEVIN MCALEER,
DUELING: THE CULT OF HONOR IN FIN-DE-SIECLE GERMANY (1994) (discussing the history of
duelling in Germany). See Irina Reyfman, The Emergence of the Duel in Russia: Corporal
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English dueling emerged in the late sixteenth century 55 and sub-
sequently incorporated smooth-bore, single-shot pistols as a substitute
for swords. This innovation greatly democratized dueling, which had
previously required some expertise with edged weapons but now
merely required the ability to squeeze a trigger.56 Although dueling in
the United States and Canada derived largely from British and conti-
nental European traditions, the lack of a noble class gave the practice
a more egalitarian as well as political flavor.57 Dueling flourished in
America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, primar-
ily in the antebellum South and particularly in Georgia, South Caro-
lina, and Louisiana.58  As in Europe, it became associated with no-
tions of chivalry and a broader code of honor-a collection of social
customs, manners, and etiquette prescribing conduct befitting gentle-
men of the upper classes. Adherence to this code, including dueling
etiquette, was essential for achieving and maintaining one's status as
a member of the dominant social class. Consequently, lawyers and
judges made up a high percentage of participants in North American
duels, along with politicians and newspaper editors.59 Not only were
such men more likely to be challenged because of statements they
Punishment and the Honor Code, 54 RUSSIAN REV. 26-43 (1995), for the history of duelling in
Russia and how the nobility attempted to reconcile it with the traditional honor code.
55 See Cecilia Morgan, 'In Search of the Phantom Misnamed Honour': Duelling in Upper
Canada, 76 CAN. HIST. REV. 529, 534 (1995) (arguing that English dueling arose as a distinct
form independent of continental European dueling traditions); but see TRUMAN, supra note 54,
at 34-35 (tracing the emergence of English dueling to the publication of Italian fencing master,
Vincent Saviolo's Treatise of Honor, in 1594). In Canada, however, the influence of French
dueling traditions should not be dismissed. Among many factors, Kiernan credits the Thirty-
Years War with the spread of the formal duel throughout Europe. See KIERNAN, supra note 48,
at 78-89.
56 See KIERNAN, supra note 48, at 144.
57 Along with politicians, lawyers, and judges, all men with upwardly mobile aspirations
attempted to adhere to codes of honor, which included obligations to duel. See Jpanne B. Free-
man, Dueling as Politics: Reinterpreting the Burr-Hamilton Duel, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 289,
294-97 (1996).
58 The only known dueling society in the United-States was in Charleston, South Carolina.
See BALDICK, supra note 52, at 117. See also HAMILTON COCHRAN, NOTED AMERICAN DUELS
AND HOSTILE ENCOUNTERS 232 (1963) (providing a brief description of the Charleston dueling
society). Several United States dueling compilations record a greater number of Southern duels
than elsewhere. See id. at 231 (describing Southern gentlemen as more accustomed to firearms,
quick-tempered, and sensitive to guarding honor that their Northern counterparts). See also
TRUMAN, supra note 55, at 78 ("[Tlhe laws against the ... custom have always been more
vigorous and restraining in the Northern States than in the Southern .... "). See generally
WILLIAM OLIVER STEVENS, PISTOLS AT TEN PACES (1940) (tracing the rise and fall of dueling
throughout American history).
-9 See Freeman, supra note 57, at 304-05. This phenomenon was not peculiar to the
United States. Sir Jonah Barrington, a noted duelist and judge on Ireland's High Court of Ad-
miralty from 1757-1791, recorded 227 official duels during his administration in which "the
number of killed and wounded among the bar was very considerable." COCHRAN, supra note
58, at 14-15. Of course, many duels may have taken place between figures of less public and
professional prominence and therefore were not publicly noted.
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made about others in public forums, but they could ill afford to risk
their social status by refusing to make or respond to challenges.
Dueling's decline was caused by many factors. Despite a prolif-
eration of laws prohibiting dueling, 60 the practice continued seem-
ingly unabated.6' Subsequent harsher laws62 and anti-dueling socie-
ties, combined with rising social disapproval and ridicule eventually
60 Such laws usually made both principals and their seconds subject to criminal punish-
ment whether or not anyone was harmed, disqualified participants from holding public office,
and required judges to issue warrants for arrest of participants when there were probable
grounds to suspect they were about to engage in a duel. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 17, 1819, 1819
Ala. Acts 64; Act of Nov. 10, 1801, 1801 Tenn. Pub. Acts 32; Act of May 22, 1852, 1852 Va.
Acts ch. 105. There are several appellate cases involving dueling laws. See Bundrick v. State,
54 S.E. 683, 685 (Ga. 1906) (holding that crime of dueling is murder, not voluntary man-
slaughter, even if parties only meet casually and one kills the other before the appointed time for
duel); Harris v. State, 58 Ga. 332, 333 (1877) (holding that consenting to act as a second is a
crime regardless of whether a duel actually occurs); Royall v. Thomas, 69 Va. 53, 54 (28 Gratt.
130, 135) (1877) (holding that public official who aids in duel may be removed from office even
if not convicted of offense in criminal action). See also Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duel:
Can These Gentlemen Be Acting Efficiently?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 326-327 nn.21 & 23
(1984) (collecting dueling cases and statutes).
In Europe, there was concern that dueling-related deaths were needlessly diminishing
the ranks of the nobility. See KIERNAN, supra note 48, at 102-04. Charles II issued a procla-
mation punishing duelists, yet during his reign, from 1660-1685, the record shows 196 duels
took place in which 75 persons died and 108 were wounded. See TRUMAN, supra note 54, at 35.
Z Factors making the laws ineffectual were many, but the most important factor was
probably the social status of the participants. Known duelists and seconds were often influential
politicians and were rarely prosecuted for their participation. See infra note 62. Despite its
illegality, there was a high incidence of dueling in the military; the lack of prosecutions indi-
cates tacit acceptance of the practice. See Bradley 3. Nicholson, Courts-Martial in the Legion
Army: American Military Lmv in the Early Republic, 1792-1796, 144 Mu- L. REv. 77, 104
n.113 (1994).
62 The evolution of dueling laws in Georgia provides a good example of this increasing
harshness. The first act prohibiting dueling simply excluded participants from public office.
See 1809 Ga. Laws 429. A second act banned participants from holding public office and re-
quired an oath from all civil and military officers stating that they had not participated in a duel
on or after January 1, 1829. See Act of Dec. 19, 1828, 1828 Ga. Laws 837. Subsequent laws
banned participants from voting as well as from holding public office and subjected them to a
$500 fine and imprisonment. It made principals guilty of a high misdemeanor subject to four to
eight years imprisonment with labor. If someone was killed, all participants, principals and
seconds, were guilty of murder and subject to the death penalty. Officers of the law could be
dismissed from office for not making an arrest when they had knowledge of a duel. See 1833
Penal Laws 203-06. Posting was also illegal. See id. at 207.
Arguably, the increasing severity of the anti-dueling laws made little impact. The hy-
pocrisy of the first act was evident when it was signed into law in 1809 by Governor David
Mitchell, who killed William Hunter in a duel at Savannah's customary dueling ground, the
Jewish Cemetery, in 1802 shortly after serving as Savannah's mayor. The participants in the
Dooly-Tait duel, see infira notes 115-26 and accompanying text, and in numerous other duels
stemming from the Yazoo land swindle, went on to hold high public office. Despite the severity
of their actions, several participants in a 1877 Georgia duel also held public office. See infra
notes 127-31 and accompanying text. An amendment to the anti-dueling law in 1865 expressly
provided for a method of commuting the murder penalty when someone died in a duel. See
1865-6 Ga. Laws 233.
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eroded support for the institution.63 By the 1880s, dueling had largely
died out in the United States.
64
B. Dueling as Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Underlying
Objectives of Dueling Codes
It is early morning on a foggy, isolated field. Two men, with
their backs to each other and observed only by their solemn seconds,
take up pistols, walk ten paces, turn, aim, and fire. One or both fall
dead or are mortally wounded. This popular picture of dueling over-
simplifies a complex social institution and obscures its underlying
objectives. Ostensibly, the objective of dueling was to determine who
would prevail in a question of honor. The method was formalized
physical violence, in which the last one standing prevailed. Surpris-
ingly, dueling was a recognized form of extra-judicial dispute resolu-65
tion sharing some of the same objectives as modem ADR -to avoid
the courts, contain violence, and promote reconciliation.
1. Avoiding Courts
In Europe, the noble class sought to avoid the courts in disputes
arising from real and perceived personal affronts. A person's honor
and reputation were highly valued in these societies and perceived as
particularly vulnerable. When and if disputes over honor were justi-
ciable, the European nobility considered public judicial proceedings
over such personal matters demeaning.66 As in Europe, dueling in the
United States was preferable over actions for libel or slander because
it avoided using social inferiors sitting in judgment, provided an op-
portunity for the parties to prove they deserved a reputation as honor-
6 See BALDICK, supra note 52, at 199-203 (attributing the decline more to ridicule than
law, citing the example of Georgia's Judge Dooley, who joked his way out of numerous duels);
STEVENS, supra note 58, at 284-86 (attributing the American rejection of dueling in part to
Mark Twain's satire of the institution).
64 According to one authority, the last duel in Georgia occurred in 1877. See Frank T.
Wheeler, Georgia's Last Duel, GA. J., Nov/Dec 1996, at 14-18.
65 In Royall v. Thomas, 69 Va. 53, 55 (28 Gratt. 130, 137) (1877), the court described it
"as a mode of arbitrament."
66 Petitioning Louis XIII to lift the ban on dueling, a French nobleman argued that he
should "not have to entrust his honor to 'menial lawyers."' KIERNAN, supra note 48, at 55. In
sympathy with aggrieved noblemen, Montaigne notes the rise of "a fourth estate of Lawyers,
breath-sellers, and pettifoggers," so much in control of the machinery of the law that its princi-
ples were often in conflict with the noble code. See MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, ESSAYS, bk. I,
chap. 22 (London, World Classics 1904-06) (1603), quoted in KIERNAN, supra note 48, at 55.
Montaigne reflects the general sentiment of the day that legal proceedings could not adequately
address personal insult or affronts. See id. In Russia, the nobility were not merely skeptical
about the power of money to compensate for an indignity, but they resented the method of com-
pensation for personal offenses under which the amount was determined by social rank. See
Reyfman, supra note 54, at 28.
[Vol. 51:69
THE ATTORNEYAS DUELIST'S FRIEND
able men, and allowed redress for words that were not actionable or
that would have yielded only nominal damages in court.67 Purport-
edly, Andrew Jackson, the most prolific duelist among United States
presidents, received the following advice from his mother: "Never tell
a lie, nor take what is not your own, nor sue anybody for slander or
assault and battery. Always settle them cases yourself."
68
2. Containing Violence
Today, Mrs. Jackson's advice would be perceived as an open in-
vitation to resort to violent self-help, but the code of honor that pre-
scribed the formalities of dueling actually constrained this violence
and reduced the lethality of the encounter. If one subscribes to this
worldview, physical violence is an extremely powerful natural urge,
and, according to some dueling apologists, part of the struggle neces-
sary to achieve justice, much like wars and revolutions. 69 The unre-
strained and easy resort to violence, however, did not befit gentlemen.
The gradual formulation and acceptance of elaborate dueling codes
and rituals, known as "code duellos," prevented the practice from be-
coming a violent free-for-all and distinguished the upper-class duel
from a lower-class brawl.70  These elaborate standards, written and
unwritten, varied among different societies and were incorporated
into the broader codes of social etiquette. Two code duellos of par-
67 According to the WILSON CODE, dueling was justified as a necessary supplement to
court. See WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 4 ("How many cases are there, that might be enu-
merated, where there is no tribunal to do justice to an oppressed and deeply wronged individ-
ual?"). See also TRUMAN, supra note 54, at 16-17 (noting that those in English-speaking coun-
tries defended dueling "on the ground that it compensates for the insufficiency of legal justice,.
. [assuming] that law is not as efficacious as lead"); Schwartz et al., supra note 60, at 325
(discussing factors that contributed to a preference for dueling over obtaining legal remedies).
63 Wheeler, supra note 64, at 14.
69 Dueling was justified as a "determined resistance to encroachments upon natural
rights." WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 4. When other remedies are unavailable, dueling be-
comes an act of self-preservation concomitant with the struggle within the natural order:
Those of different species are at perpetual warfare. The sweetest rose tree will
sicken and waste on the near approach of the noxious bramble, and the most prom-
ising fields of wheat yield a miserable harvest if choked up with tares and thistles.
The elements themselves war together .... The principal of self-preservation is co-
extensive with creation ....
Id. at 4-5. Bosquett similarly noted that law could not suppress dueling because "[it has been
custom from the earliest ages to decide differences and avenge injuries by single combat."
BosQutErT, supra note 2, at 16.
70 See FREVERT, supra note 54, at 150-71 (discussing the social significance of dueling
protocol); KIERNAN, supra note 48, at 145-46 (opining that the evolution of dueling parallels
that of war, with the codification of dueling etiquette equated with the development of intema-
tional conventions); cf STEVENS, supra note 58, at 40 (noting that, considering the extent to
which Georgians in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries armed themselves, the
duel provided a useful check on general rhurder).
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ticular influence in the United States were the Irish Code of Honor71
and its American version, authored by South Carolina governor John
Lyde Wilson, known as the Wilson Code.72 These and other code
duellos 73 defined conduct that justified an injured party to issue the
challenge, specified when a failure to issue a challenge would be dis-
honorable, prescribed the appropriate responses of the party chal-
lenged, regulated the conduct of seconds, and provided rules of en-
gagement on the dueling ground.
Adherence to prevailing conventions of dueling, well known by
the upper classes, was essential to proving one's right to be a gentle-
man among those who ascribed or aspired to high social status. This
social pressure to conform to the dueling conventions had the func-
tional purpose of forcing principals to channel their urge for violence
into a rigid procedural framework that reduced the possibility of le-
thal injury. Dueling traditions discouraged parties from acting in the
heat of passion by prohibiting challenges in immediate reaction to a
perceived insult and before the offended party had sought advice and
politely requested an acceptable explanation or apology, known as an
amende honorable,74 from the other party.75 Although presumably
the mere threat of lethal encounters had a sobering influence and in-
hibited some provoking behavior, gentleman could not demean them-
selves by fighting at the time of the insult, when their "blood ran hot,"
causing an uncontrolled melee.76 If a duel was fought, the rules of
engagement, prescribed by the code duello and negotiated by the sec-
onds, prohibited unfair advantage, thus reducing the opportunity for
71 IRISH CODE OF HONOR [hereinafter IRISH CODE], reprinted in WILSON CODE, supra
note 1, at app. The IRISH CODE was also known as the "twenty-six commandments." They
were "adopted at the Clonmel Summer Assizes, 1777, for the government of duellists, by the
gentlemen of Tipperary, Galway, Mayo, Sligo and Roscommon, and prescribed for general
adoption throughout Ireland." BALDICK, supra note 52, at 33-34.
72 WILSON CODE, supra note 1.
73 The prevailing code in England was the Royal Code of Honor. See Schwartz et al.,
supra note 60, at 322 n.7. In Germany, as late as 1891, Gustav Hergsell authored the DUELL-
CODEX (Vienna, Pest, Leipzig, A. Hartlebens Verlag 1891).
74 See KIERNAN, supra note 48, at 139 ("It came to be the practice in French legal actions
over insult or libel for the court to order the offender to make public withdrawal, by amende
honorable and reparation d'honneur.").
75 See WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 12 ("Never send a challenge in the first instance,
for that precludes all negotiation. Let your note be in the language of a gentleman, and let the
subject matter of complaint be truly and fairly set forth, cautiously avoiding contributing to the
adverse party any improper motive."). See also id. at 18 (explaining to a party receiving a note
before a challenge, "[i]f the note received be in abusive terms, object to its reception, and return
it for that reason; but if it be respectful, return and answer of the same character, in which re-
spond correctly and openly to all interrogatories fairly propounded").
76 See IRISH CODE, supra note 71, at 41-42 ("Challenges are never to be delivered at
night, unless the party to be challenged intend leaving the place of offence before morning; for it
is desirable to avoid all hot-headed proceedings.") See also id at 38 ("[A] blow is strictly pro-
hibited under any circumstances among gentlemen.").
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one side to have a better chance of killing the other.77 Additionally,
the limitations of the prescribed weaponry reduced lethality. The of-
ficial dueling pistol with its smooth bore was notoriously inaccurate
except at close range and subject to misfire.78 Although there was
some variation based on the severity of the offense, the rules limited
the number of shots fired and required the duel to terminate at first
injury, thereby reducing the probability of lethal injury. The first
eleven rules of the Irish Code specified, for example, to what degree a
particular offense required the drawing of blood and limited the num-
ber of shots to be exchanged.79 Under the Wilson Code, the duel
should end if blood was drawn or, in the case of minor insults, after
the first exchange of shots. 0
3. Promoting Reconciliation
Another functional purpose and underlying objective of code du-
ellos was to encourage peaceful resolution and personal reconcilia-
tion. In the preface of the Wilson Code, the author stresses the
peacemaking function of the code's provisions and gauges his own
success of applying them as a second.81 Before the principals could
77 The WILSON CODE counsels:
Duty of Challengee and His Second Before Fighting.
1. After all efforts for a reconciliation are over, the party aggrieved sends a chal-
lenge to his adversary, which is delivered to his second.
2. Upon the acceptance of the challenge, the seconds make the necessary arrange-
ments for the meeting, in which each party is entitled to a perfect equality. The old
notion that the party challenged, was authorized to name the time, place, distance
and weapon, has been long since exploded; nor would a man of chivalric honor use
such a right, if he possessed it. The time must be as soon as practicable, the place
such as had-ordinarily been used where the parties are, the distance usual, and the
weapon that which is most generally used, which, in this State, is the pistol.
3. If the chaliengee insist upon what is not usual in time, place, distance and
weapon, do not yield the point, and tender in writing what is usual in each, and if he
refuses to give satisfaction, then your friend may post him.
WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 21-22.
The fair play requirement was so important that a principal's own second could kill him
for a breach. In an 1806 Georgian duel between William Crawford and General John Clark, the
seconds negotiated terms that included the following: "Article 11. If either of the principals
deviate from the... rules, or attempt to take any undue advantage, either or both the seconds
are at liberty to fire at him." SErrz, supra note 48, at 120.
78 See KIERNAN, supra note 48, at 143-44 (estimating that only one in fourteen duels
resulted in a mortal wound, while only one in six resulted in any wounds).
79 See IRISH CODE, supra note 71, at 39-41.
80 See WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 25-26 (explaining the second's duty to stop the duel
after shots have been fired and one person is injured).
81 See id. at 10 ("Under these circumstances, the following rules are given to the public,
and if I can save the life of one useful member of society, I will be compensated. I have re-
stored to the bosoms of many, their sons, by my timely interference, who are ignorant of the
misery I have averted from them."). Similarly, Bosquett stated that he had served twenty-five
times as a second and that "life or honour were never lost in my hands." BOSQUETr, supra note
2, at 16.
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take action, they were required to engage a "friend" as a second.82
Seconds served to de-escalate the conflict. They were close or influ-
ential friends of the principals, of equal social rank, and familiar with
prevailing dueling norms and procedures. They performed a variety
of functions, including serving as witnesses, providing moral support,
guarding against ambush or foul play, insuring adherence to the rules,
and joining in combat with the principals if necessary.83  While
largely ignored by commentators, a second's most important function
under both the Irish and American code duellos was to bring about a
reconciliation between the parties.84
In the early nineteenth century, American dueling custom pre-
scribed a content and order of procedure that facilitated the second's
peacemaking role. Seconds were to have complete control. Princi-
pals were to give the entire matter over to the seconds and defer to
their advice in all aspects of the dispute.85 Seconds served as the in-
termediaries for all communications and insured that all correspon-
dence between the parties was stylistically polite and formal.86 The
8 See WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 12 ("When you believe yourself aggrieved, be
silent on the subject, speak to no one about the matter, and see your friend, who is to act for you,
as soon as possible.").
83 See KIERNAN, supra note 48, at 137-40 (discussing the functions of seconds in empha-
sizing the duty of guaranteeing fair play). See also BILLACOIS, supra note 48, at 65 (describing
how the French institutionalized the use of equal numbers of seconds, "thirds," or "fourths" by
the late sixteenth century). In Spanish, the second was referred to as "godfather." See id.
Under the IRISH CODE: "When seconds disagree, and resolve to exchange shots them-
selves, it must be at the same time and at right angles with their principals." IRISH CODE, supra
note 71, at44.
84 See id. at 43 ("Seconds are bound to attempt a reconciliation before the meeting takes
place, or after sufficient firing or hits, as specified."); WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 24-28
(outlining the conciliatory function of seconds). See also KIERNAN, supra note 48, at 138 (rec-
ognizing that cooperation in seeking a peaceful solution was also an accepted part of a second's
duty under European dueling traditions).
85 See WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 12 ("When your second is in full possession of the
facts, leave the whole matter to his judgment, and avoid any consultation with him unless he
seeks it. He has the custody of your honor, and by obeying him you cannot be compromitted
[sic].").
The WILSON CODE also provides: "Second's Duty Before Challenge Sent. 1. When-
ever you are applied to by a friend to act as his second, before you agree to do so, state distinctly
to your principal that you will be governed only by your own judgment .. " Id. at 13. The
WILSON CODE continues:
Second's Duty of the Party Receiving a Note Before Challenge Sent.
1. When consulted by your friend, who has received a note requiring explanation,
inform him distinctly that he must be governed wholly by you in the progress of
the dispute. If he refuses, decline to act on that ground.
Id. at 20.
86 The WILSON CODE counsels:
Second's Duty Before Challenge Sent.
2.... Check hi m [sic] if he uses opprobrious epithet towards his adversary, and
never permit improper or insulting words in the note you carry.
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requirement of equal social rank8 7 and friendship with the disputants
gave weight to their opinions as to whether honor had been put into
question or satisfied by the opposing party's response. It also gave
them the influence to calm their principals down.Y8 Before the issu-
ance of a challenge, a second would seek to obtain an amende honor-
able-some acceptable statement, if not an outright apology, from the
other side that would allow his principal to declare that his honor was
intact or restored. Seconds were advised not to press the side offering
the amende honorable for too much. 89  Alternatively, the seconds
could achieve an "adjustment" by soliciting an exchange of state-
ments from the principals that refrained the original offense as inof-
fensive. If the parties refused to reconcile, the seconds could investi-
gate the facts and suggest an honorable solution that avoided a lethal
encounter.90 The Wilson Code allowed a second to withdraw when
his principal refused to follow his advice or to settle on terms consis-
tent with his findings of fact.91 If the parties reached the dueling
3. To the note you carry in writing to the party complained of, you are entitled to a
written answer, which will be directed to your principal and will be delivered to you
by his adversary's friend. If this be not written in the style of a gentleman, refuse to
receive it, and assign your reason for such refusal.
Id. at 14.
87 See IRISH CODE, supra note 71, at 41 ("Seconds to be of equal rank in society with the
principals they attend, inasmuch as a second may choose or chance to become a principal, and
equality is indispensable.").
The WILSON CODE provides:
Second's Duty Before Challenge Sent.
1.... You are supposed to be cool and collected, and your friend's feelings are more
or less irritated.
2. Use every effort to soothe and tranquilize your principal; do not see things in the
same aggravated light in which he views them; extenuate the conduct of his adver-
sary whenever you see clearly an opportunity to do so, without doing violence to
your friend's irritated mind. Endeavor to persuade him that there must have been
some misunderstanding in the matter.
WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 13-14. The WILSON CODE continues:
Second's Duty of the Party Receiving a Note Before Challenge Sent.
2. Use your utmost efforts to allay all excitement which your principal may labor
under, search diligently into the origin of the misunderstanding; for gentleman sel-
dom insult each other, unless they labor under some misapprehension or mistake;
and when you have discovered the original ground of error, follow each movement
to the time of sending the note, and harmony will be restored.
Id at 20.
" The WvILSON CODE advised:
When an accommodation is tendered, never require too much; and if the party of-
fering the amende honorable, wishes to give a reason for his conduct in the matter,
do not, unless offensive to your friend, refuse to receive it; by so doing you may heal
the breach more effectually.
Id at 16-17.
90 See id at 18-19 (describing the conduct required of a party who receives a note from an
equal before challenge). See also id at 26-27 (describing the second's duty to reconcile the
duelling parties after shots have been fired and no one has been hit).
SI See id at 18-19. See also id at 25-26.
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ground without reconciling and the seconds failed to suggest an ac-
ceptable adjustment preserving the honor of both disputants, the sec-
onds were instructed to end the duel if no one was hit after the first
round of shots by having the "principals meet on middle ground,
shake hands and be friends." 92 The honor of the seconds was also at
stake, and their success in resolving the matter depended greatly on
their known integrity and ability to trust one another.93
4. Inquiry and Posting
By the nineteenth century, the American code duello included
two other widely accepted conventions--commissions of inquiry and
posting. Under this first convention, seconds and other influential
friends or members of the community would conduct their own in-
vestigation of the dispute and either recommend the content of an
amende honorable or issue a finding of fact designed to mitigate the
actions or words that caused the affront.94 This is similar to commis-
sions of inquiry under international law.95 If such an inquiry pro-
duced a face-saving adjustment or a finding of fact declaring no rea-
son to take offense, the principals could disengage with their honor
intact or the seconds could abandon their principals on the grounds
that there was no reason for them to duel. The seconds' refusal to
continue service effectively removed the social imprimatur from the
proceedings. While seconds could conduct these inquiries, additional
friends, a step removed from the conduct of the duel, may have been
more effective in this role.
96
Posting was a dueling tradition unique to the United States. It
was the act of making a public declaration either through the newspa-
pers or by distribution of a handbill that one of the parties violated the
code of honor. A classic example resulted from a dispute between
General James Wilkinson and Congressman John Randolph of Vir-
ginia in 1807. Wilkinson challenged Randolph, but Randolph refused
to be drawn out. After warning Randolph that he would post him and
92 Id. at 26. Such intervention was only acceptable in matters that were not a serious
cause of complaint. If the insult was of a serious nature, the second of the challenger was in-
structed to refuse reconciliation until someone was injured or the offender offered adequate
reparations. See id. at 26.
93 See KIERNAN, supra note 48, at 138.
94 See id. at 139 (noting that a cooperative examination of the facts was an accepted part
of the role of seconds in European dueling practice).
95 See Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 28, 1899, 32
Stat. 1779, 187 Consol. T.S. 410, as amended, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, 205 Consol. T.S.
233. Under international law, inquiry is much like fact-finding as there are no recommendations
accompanying the findings; however, an "enlarged inquiry" includes the issuance of recom-
mendations and has been used to avoid duels. See YARN, supra note 21, at 88-89, 178-80.
9 See text accompanying notes 106-09, 124-26 infra.
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receiving no reply, Wilkinson placed the following notice at all tav-
erns and street corners in Washington:
HECTOR UNMASKED.--In justice to my character I de-
nounce to the world John Randolph, a member of Congress
as a prevaricating, base, calumniating scoundrel, poltroon
and coward.97
Under the code duello, the second of the offended party was al-
lowed to post the offender if the offender refused to accept the note
requesting an apology or explanation, 98 if the offender refused to meet
either the challenger or the challenger's second based on claims of
social inequality,99 or if a principal came upon the dueling ground but
refused to fight when required.'t If the challenged party sought to
gain some advantage on the dueling ground by insisting upon terms
that were unusual in time, place, distance, or choice of weapon, the
second of the challenger could post him.101 Posting served as a decla-
ration that a principal did not adhere to the code of honor and thus
was not a gentleman. Not being gentlemen, posted individuals were
not worthy of the privilege of dueling with gentlemen.102 Others had
the right to refuse a note or challenge from posted persons.'0 3 From a
functional perspective, a duelist who could honorably avoid a duel
with someone who might not adhere to the rules was avoiding a po-
tentially more dangerous encounter.
97 COCHRAN, supra note 58, at 20.
98 See WILSoN CODE, supra note 1, at 15 (explaining the second's ability to ask for a
reason for refusal of a note, and upon refusal for a reason, the ability to post the refusing party).
99 See iL at 15-16 (explaining when the second is obligated to substitute himself for the
principal due to social inequality between the principal and the challenger).
100 See id. at 27 (explaining that the cowardly principal's second is required to state, "I
have come upon the ground with a coward, and do tender you my apology for an ignorance of
his character, you are at liberty to post him").
'0' See id. at 22.
202 Since one could not challenge someone of lower social rank, a caning or a flogging
would have to do. Thus, when Sen. Preston Brooks of South Carolina caned Massachusetts Sen.
Charles Sumner senseless on the floor of the Senate in 1856, it could be argued that he was
expressing his estimation of Sumner's social class.
Although he was not posted, since it was not the custom in Ireland, Leonard McNally
could not get any Irish gentleman to accept his challenge. This caused him such distress that
when Sir Barrington "out of Christian charity" decided to accept his challenge and wounded
him, McNally said afterwards that Barrington's shot was his "salvation." TRUMAN, supra note
54, at 560-561.
103 See WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 19 (explaining that a party may refuse to receive a
note if the challenger is a minor, has been posted, has been publicly disgraced, has an illegal
occupation, or is a lunatic).
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C. Some "Successful" and Varied Applications of the Code Duello
The deadliness of duels is well-documented.1t 4 Despite the
seeming barbarity of the practice, proponents of dueling sincerely
believed that the formalities of dueling saved more lives than were
spent. When applied correctly, code duellos aided reconciliation or at
least reduced the chances of lethality. Such averted duels were rarely
reported, however, due to a combination of the illegality of the prac-
tice and the lack of bloodshed. Beyond public recognition that every-
one's honor remained intact, there was little reason for participants in
such exchanges to make them public. Hence, there is a scarcity of
well-documented "successful" code duello applications. This is
similar to the practical absence of public paper trails of privately set-
tled legal claims. Fortunately, there is sufficient contemporary infor-
mation on four averted duels to illustrate the effective and varied use
of code duellos in nineteenth-century America.
1. The Lincoln-Shields Duel 05
Despite his oft-quoted advice to engage in peacemaking,1t 6
Abraham Lincoln was no stranger to dueling. In 1842, James Shields,
the Illinois state auditor, challenged Lincoln, an Illinois state senator,
to a duel. The state bank had collapsed, and Shields, a Democrat, had
to inform the people of Illinois that they could not pay their taxes with
bank notes. Lincoln and the Whigs seized this opportunity to under-
mine the Democrats. A series of satirical letters generally thought to
have been written by Lincoln appeared in the Sangamo Journal under
the title, "Lost Township" and signed by "Rebecca." Shields felt that
references to him in these letters crossed the line between the political
and the personal. Discovering Lincoln to be the author, Shields sent a
note through his "friend" John D. Whiteside to Lincoln demanding a
retraction of the offending statements and an apology. Lincoln
avoided a retraction and apology by complaining that Shields's letter
was offensive for assuming too much about authorship of the letters
and for lacking specificity as to which portions caused offense.
Shortly thereafter, a frustrated Shields issued the challenge.
104 See sources cited supra note 58 (detailing famous American examples including Alex-
ander Hamilton's death in the duel with Burr, Button Gwinnett's fatal wounding by McIntosh,
and Stephen Decatur's by James Barron).
105 See Douglas L. Wilson, Lincoln's Affair of Honor, ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, Feb. 1998, at
64-72, for a discussion of the circumstances surrounding Lincoln's 1842 duel with James
Shields. See also James R. Webb, Pistols for Two... Coffee for One, AM. HERrrAGE, Feb.
1975, at 66-84 (describing Lincoln's "lampooning" of James Shields's politics in a local Illinois
newspaper, which eventually led to the duel between Shields and Lincoln). The description of
these events which follows is drawn from these sources.
'06 See supra note 18.
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While dueling was against the law in Illinois and opposed by
Lincoln, the code of honor had such considerable force that Lincoln
was compelled to respond to the challenge or lose his social status.
Lincoln named Elias Merryman as his "friend," or second, and
Shields named Whiteside as his. At their initial meeting, the two sec-
onds pledged to obtain a peaceful resolution of difficulties. To that
end, Whiteside hoped that Governor Thomas Ford and General W. L.
D. Ewing, an influential Democratic leader, could talk Shields out of
the duel. Before Whiteside could enlist this assistance, however, he
learned that Lincoln had already dictated the terms of the duel-
weapons, time, and place-and had departed for Jacksonville without
consulting his second. 1 7 Under these conditions, Whiteside could
neither agree to terms nor negotiate further, nor could he consult his
principal, who was traveling outside of Springfield. Whiteside
withdrew his pledge to Merryman but agreed to advise Shields of
what had transpired and to meet Lincoln's party on the appointed day.
On that day, both parties and their seconds accompanied by other
friends arrived on the dueling ground, an island on the Mississippi
River in the state of Missouri. With no adjustment in sight, Lincoln,
as the challenged party, set forth his terms: broad swords within two
enclosed rectangular spaces, out of which the combatants could not
step. The rectangles were separated by a board on edge, over which
the combatants faced each other but could not cross, and demarcated
by back lines that were approximately a sword's length plus three feet
from the board. While this obviously gave Lincoln, abnormally tall
with disproportionately long arms, the clear advantage, he was willing
to have the dispute adjusted. Shields was not so willing, however.
17 In an attempt to create an opportunity for conciliation, Lincoln wrote the following
instructions for his second:
In case Whitesides [sic] shall signify a wish to adjust this affair without further
difficulty, let him know that if the present papers be withdrawn, & a note from Mr.
Shields asking to know if I am the author of the articles of which he complains, and
asking that I shall make him gentlemanly satisfaction, if I am the author, and this
without menace, or dictation as to what that satisfaction shall be, a pledge is made,
but the following answer shall be given-
"I did write the 'Lost Township' letter which appeared in the Journal of the 2nd
[instance] but had no participation, in any form, in the other article alluding to you.
I wrote that, wholly for political effect. I had no indication of injuring your personal
or private character or standing as a man or a gentleman; and I did not then think,
and do not now think that that article, could produce or has produced that effect
against you, and had I anticipated such an effect I would have forborne to write it.
And I will add, that your conduct towards me, as far as I knew, had always been
gentlemanly; and that I had no personal pique against you, and no cause for any."
Wilson, supra note 105, at 70. Reportedly, Whiteside told Merryman that an approach to recon-
ciliation based on withdrawal of Mr. Shields's note would never be consented to by his princi-
pal. See id.
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Two men present, John J. Hardin, a leading Whig, and Revill W.
English, a Democrat, suggested the case be submitted to impartial
judges. 10 8 The commission of inquiry was never formed as Shields's
friends declared the offending note withdrawn. Lincoln's friends then
accepted, responding that Lincoln had written the letters "solely for
political effect" not intending to injure "the personal or private char-
acter or standing of Mr. Shields as a gentleman or a man."' 9 All of
this transpired without the knowledge of Shields and Lincoln. 10
Shields's friends had prevented the duel by effectively declaring it
unnecessary. They believed his honor was no longer in need of vin-
dication and forced him to accept the adjustment. The seconds
stepped between the parties and took their swords from them."'
Lincoln's duel is a textbook example of reconciliation by sec-
onds. When insulted, Shields enlisted the aid of Whiteside and issued
his challenge only after sending a letter requesting an apology. Lin-
coln selected Merryman because of his familiarity with the code du-
ello.1 2 The seconds adhered to the code. Except for Lincoln's letter
setting out the terms, all communications between the disputants were
either through the seconds or in correspondence delivered by them.
Whiteside and Merryman met and pledged to pursue reconciliation,
which was thwarted by their principals. In fact, by setting forth his
terms for the duel, Lincoln violated the code duello, which forbade
the issuance of terms that would put the parties on unequal footing on
the dueling ground. Moreover, under the Wilson Code the challenged
party had no authority to demand choice of weapons." 3  This may
'08 See id. at 7 1.
109 Id.
10 See id. According to Whiteside, "This was all done without the knowledge or consent
of Mr. Shields, and he refused to accede to it, until Dr. Hope, General Ewing, and myself de-
clared the apology sufficient, and that we could not sustain him in going further." See id.
11 Not all of the combatants' friends were prepared for an adjustment. William Butler,
one of Lincoln's friends, regarded the efforts of the seconds to stop the fight as interference.
Years later, he told Lincoln's presidential secretary, John G. Nicolay, "the duel was about pro-
ceed, when Hardin and English interfered and stopped it." Id Nicolay continued:
Butler says he does not know how the matter was arranged-that he had become
disgusted with the whole proceeding and was sitting on a log about thirty feet away
expecting to see a bloody fight, when much to his astonishment the whole affair
came to an end-the seconds suddenly stepping between the combatants and taking
their swords from them.
Id.
112 See id. at 69.
113 The WILSON CODE provides:
Duty of Challengee and His Second Before Fighting.
1. After all efforts for a reconciliation are over, the party aggrieved sends a chal-
lenge to his adversary, which is delivered to his second.
2. Upon the acceptance of the challenge, the seconds make the necessary arrange-
ments for the meeting, in which each party is entitled to a perfect equality. The old
notion that the party challenged, was authorized to name the time, place, distance
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have further inflamed Shields, who could have opted to post Lincoln
and refused to fight," 4 and it undermined the seconds' attempt at rec-
onciliation. Fortunately, additional friends of considerable social and
political influence contacted by the- seconds arrived at the dueling
ground to affect an adjustment, through fact-finding if necessary. In
response to Lincoln's admission that he wrote the second offending
letter and his denial of intent to insult Shields personally, Shields's
seconds concluded that their principal's honor was intact, thereby ob-
viating the need for a duel. Because Shields insisted on proceeding,
his seconds threatened to withdraw their support, in conformity with
the code duello.
2. The Dooly-Tait Duel"
5
In 1802, Charles Tait-a Georgia lawyer who later served as a
superior court judge--challenged John M. Dooly to a duel. Dooly
was also a lawyer-he was to later serve as state solicitor general and
superior court judge, and he also ran unsuccessfully for Congress.
Dooly was known for using his wit to escape from fights." 6 In this
instance, however, he was unable to extricate himself from the deadly
political tensions growing out of the Yazoo land deal." 7 The Yazoo
land deal was the primary source of tension between two emerging
political parties in Georgia, the Troup and Clark parties. Tait was a
member of the Troup party, and Dooly was a member of the Clark
party. After a lawsuit in which Tait and Peter Lawrence Van Allen, a
and weapon, has been long since exploded; nor would a man of chivalric honor use
such a right, if he possessed it. The time must be as soon as practicable, the place
such as had ordinarily been used where the parties are, the distance usual, and the
weapon that which is most generally used, which, in this State, is the pistol.
3. If the challengee insist upon what is not usual in time, place, distance and
weapon, do not yield the point, and tender in writing what is usual in each, and if he
refuses to give satisfaction, then your friend may post him.
WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 21-22. But see IRISH CODE, supra note 71, at 42 (allow-
ing the challenged to choose any weapon including swords, unless the challenger swears
that he has no skill with the sword).
224 See supra Part ILBA.
.Is See E. Merton Coulter, A Famous Duel That Was Never Fought, 43 GA. HIST. Q., 365-
377 (1953) (summarizing the Dooly-Tait duel). This following account of the duel is drawn
from this source.
116 Subsequent accounts of this duel contain an interesting tale of Dooly avoiding an ex-
change of volleys by insisting he be allowed to sheath one leg in a hollowed-out gum tree be-
cause Tait had a wooden leg. See Ud at 369-70. This embellishment of the Dooly-Tait duel is
derived probably from reports of a duel in Louisiana between a Captain Foster, who did have a
wooden leg, and one Mr. Molineaux. Foster reportedly insisted that Molineaux should lean a
piece of wood the height to Foster's false leg up against his left leg so that the dueling ground
would favor neither principal. Molineaux's shot is said to have shattered Foster's wooden leg.
See TRUMAN, supra note 54, at 562-63.
17 See HARNETT T. KANE, GENTLEMEN, SWORDS AND PISTOLS 153-67 (1951); SErz,
supra note 48, at 110-112 (detailing the rise of the Yazoo land swindle).
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friend of Dooly's, were involved, Tait challenged Van Allen to a
duel. In turn, Van Allen asked Dooly to advise him on whether he
was accountable to Tait. After some inquiries, Dooly advised him to
refuse Tait's challenge on the grounds that Tait was not a gentleman,
therefore not deserving of satisfaction. After attempting to maneuver
Dooly into a duel with him over the effrontery of Dooly's advice,
William Crawford, a friend of Tait, challenged Van Allen to a duel.
Just prior to that duel, Tait sent letters to Dooly requesting an admis-
sion that he advised Van Allen that Tait was "no gentleman." Dooly
sent a verbal reply that he had no answer "other than what Tait al-
ready knew." 118 A few days latter, Crawford killed Van Allen on the
dueling ground. Tait continued to press for an encounter with Dooly;
Dooly responded that, because of Van Allen's death, Tait's request
was too late. In frustration, Tait finally issued a challenge on the
fourth of August. Dooly delayed, responding that he was seeking
advice on how to proceed now that his friend and former principal,
Van Allen, was dead. After some delay, arrangements were made for
both parties, accompanied by a "friend," to meet at Barksdale's Ferry
on the third of September, cross into South Carolina, and there agree
on the actual dueling ground.
In the intervening time between the issuance of the challenge and
the date of the encounter, Dr. William Wyatt Bibb was hard at work
on a compromise to avoid the duel. He put himself in the most un-
usual position by delivering Tait's challenge to Dooly and delivering
Dooly's correspondence to Tait. Thus, although he accepted Taft's
formal request to serve as his second, he effectively made himself the
second of both parties. In addition, he agreed to be the standby sur-
geon for both. Van Allen was dead, and the rest of Dooly's friends
were so opposed to dueling that he could not find a second, so he ap-
peared alone at the dueling ground but for Dr. Bibb, officially Tait's
second. Dr. Bibb in conference with Dooly worked out a written ad-
justment, which he and Dooly signed. In answer to Dooly's conten-
tion that Tait had applied too late for Dooly's explanation, Tait re-
sponded that he would have done so earlier had he not thought Craw-
ford would and that he did so as soon after the Van Allen-Crawford
duel "as his indisposition would permit.' ' 19 In response, Dooly an-
swered that he never gave the objectionable opinion of Tait to Van
Allen. 120 Afterwards, "the parties shook hands on terms of mutual
friendship. 121 This was a successful reconciliation as evidenced by
118 Coulter, supra note 115, at 375.
"9 I at 377.
'2 See id.
121 id.
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the continuing relationship of the principals. Dooly, as state solicitor
general, appeared frequently before Circuit Judge Tait. Dr. Bibb sub-
sequently became a congressman, senator, and the first governor of
Alabama.
While the intervention of Tait's second as a quasi-mediator is
unusual, the overall incident follows the code duello's prescriptive
pattern. The offended party withheld a challenge until after seeking
an amende honorable. Lacking a satisfactory response, Tait issued
his challenge. All communications were through Dr. Bibb. The fail-
ure of Dooly to find his own second may have been irregular, but it
did provide a unique opportunity for reconciliation.
3. The Jones-Gardner Duel
1 22
In 1843, another potentially lethal Georgia duel was adjusted by
tactful intervention. The controversy, which followed the acquittal of
William Platt for the fatal shooting of a prominent local Democrat,
was fueled by the political rivalry between the Democrats and the
rival Whig party. 123 Whig James Jones, co-owner and editor of the
Augusta Daily Chronicle and Sentinel, was incensed by the acquittal
and denounced the verdict claiming the sheriff had packed the jury
with Democrats. Democrat James Gardner responded in defense of
the sheriff through the editorial page of the Augusta Constitutionalist
under the pseudonym "Fair Play," accusing Jones of purely political
motives. Jones discovered that Gardner had written the editorials and
confronted him. The letters between the antagonists illustrate the re-
quirements of formality' 24 and the use of seconds, Col. T. H. Kenan
for Jones and John McKinne for Gardner, as intermediaries. As in the
Lincoln-Shields affair, however, the seconds were unable to dissuade
their principals without the help of additional influential interveners.
In this case, Henry H. Cumming and Charles Jones Jenkins, respected
Augustans who had defended Platt, formed a commission of inquiry.
On August 5, 1843, they issued their findings in an exhaustive letter
outlining the underlying facts of the dispute in such a way as to show
that both men were "actuated by fair and honorable motives," and that
their current reputation as gentlemen "is sufficient in a doubtful case,
12 See generally Lee Ann Caldwell Swann, An Averted Duel: Augusta, 1843, 65 GA. HIST.
Q. 323-28 (1981) (providing a recent account of the 1843 duel). The following account of the
controversy is drawn from this source.
123 When introduced to Platt at a social function, Harding purportedly only bowed rather
than shook hands. Gravely insulted, Platt subsequently shot Harding (just the sort of uncon-
trolled violence that might have been avoided had Platt ascribed to the code duello). See id. at
324.
12 For an example of the polite formality required under the code duello, see id. at 324-26
(reproducing letters exchanged in the Jones-Gardner duel).
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to entitle each to the most favorable construction of his language and
conduct."125 The commission concluded that neither man was justi-
fied in his charges against the other and recommended "that the con-
troversy between these gentlemen be Terminated by each admitting
what they and their respective friends claim for them, that which
common benevolence ought cheerfully to concede... [that each had]
fair and honorable motives.' 26 Presumably, this was a sufficient ad-
justment to leave the principals' honor intact and put the matter to
rest.
Unlike the Lincoln-Shields and Dooly-Tait affairs, this dispute
was resolved before the parties actually stood on the dueling ground.
An apology was sought before the challenge. While the principals
used seconds as interveners and intermediaries, other influential par-
ties effected settlement through fact-finding and skillful adjustment.
4. The Adams-Richards Duel
127
In May 1877, two lawyers, Samuel Barnard Adams and Rodolph
Rufus Richards, represented opposing parties in the city court of Sa-
vannah, Georgia. Adams's client prevailed, winning a judgment of
$25.12, and Richards moved for a retrial. At the motion hearing, Ri-
chards objected to Adams's filing of a late brief. Believing Richards
had agreed orally to the late filing, Adams moved to disbar Richards.
Richards took this motion as a personal affront. In subsequent corre-
spondence, Richards accused Adams of insulting him further in front
of the tax collector's office shortly after the disbarment motion. Ri-
chards, in turn, had accused Adams of being a liar and restrained him-
self from slapping Adams's face there on the street. Instead, Richards
sought out another lawyer, Edward Hollis, to act as his second and
drafted a letter demanding an apology and withdrawal of the motion.
This letter, delivered the next day by Hollis, accused Adams of in-
sulting Richards verbally some three hours after the hearing and of
failing to respond in a gentlemanly manner when Richards replied
that he was a liar. Richards concluded that by filing the disbarment
motion, Adams had not acted as a gentleman.
Adams immediately enlisted fellow lawyer Peter Meldrim as his
second. In turn, Meldrim enlisted the aid of a "third," Dr. William
Duncan. An exchange of notes took place between the principals in
an attempt to achieve an amende honorable. The seconds conveyed
'2 Id. at 328.
126 Id.
127 See generally Wheeler, supra note 64, for an account of the Adams-Richards Duel.
Samuel Adams's documents, obtained by the Georgia Historical Society in 1996, contained the
correspondence among the principals and seconds, the final written adjustment, and a detailed
account of the duel written by one of the seconds.
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the notes and carefully monitored them for offensive language, but an
impasse was evident, and Richards soon issued the challenge:
I disagree with you in all you state. You have insulted me
grossly and have refused to tender an apology, [sic] my cor-
respondence with you Sir is at an end. I now ask at your
hand's [sic] that satisfaction which all gentlemen under such
circumstances have the right to demand and to expect.
128
Adams accepted the next day, and the seconds arranged the terms,
agreeing upon Brampton Plantation as the dueling ground.
During their meeting to negotiate and sign the "Articles of
Agreement," Hollis and Meldrim discussed settling the matter peace-
fully, but Hollis refused to compromise on Richards's demands. Be-
lieving that a duel was unwarranted but that the opposing side had left
Adams no option, Meldrim rejected a request from additional friends,
Thomas Norwood and Julian Hartridge, to intercede and attempt an
adjustment. After the principals and their seconds arrived at the
plantation the next day, Norwood and Hartridge persisted by offering
to arbitrate the matter. For most of the day, the duel was postponed
while the seconds considered the offer and negotiated via an ex-
change of notes over the terms of acceptance. Although Meldrim and
Hollis were willing to submit the matter to arbitration, Hollis would
do so only on one condition-namely, that if the arbitrators found
Adams in the wrong, then Adams agreed that he would place his
apology upon the minutes of the superior court. Meldrim said his
principal would do so only if the arbitrators directed, but he would not
agree to a predetermined remedy.
At 6:15 p.m., negotiations ceased and the participants took their
places on the ground-the principals facing each other, thirty-six feet
apart, with their seconds standing across from one another at ninety
degree angles from their principals. Adams and Richards exchanged
one volley from short-barreled, smooth-bore dueling pistols and
missed. The seconds discussed whether there should be a settlement
or another exchange of fire. Dr. Duncan pressed for a prompt deci-
sion, noting that the increasing darkness would put Adams, who was
nearsighted, at a disadvantage. Meldrim asked Hollis if his man was
satisfied, and Hollis answered, "Mr. Richards has been grossly in-
jured and unless Mr. Adams can make reparation, we should con-
tinue.'' 129 Meldrim responded, "Our position is the same now that it
was ... and ... has always been. If you will address to me a courte-
128 Wheeler, supra note 64, at 16.
'29 Id. at 18.
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ous note, I will give a courteous response. '1 3° Hollis agreed; Meldrim
drafted and signed an adjustment. 131 The principals stepped to the
middle of the dueling ground, shook hands, and returned as friends
and colleagues to Savannah in a carriage. Hollis died of tuberculosis
two years after the duel, but Adams, Richards, and Meldrim went on
to become prominent lawyers. Adams filled a term on the Georgia
Supreme Court in 1902, was president of the state bar, and served as
city attorney for most of his career. Meldrim served as alderman,
mayor, and state senator. He also was president of the state bar and
was elected president of the American Bar Association in 1915.
This duel literally "followed the book." Apparently, the seconds
used an actual copy of the Wilson Code. A torn-out copy of the title
page with a note from Hollis to Meldrim was discovered among Ad-
ams's documents. Adams himself credited the Wilson Code with dis-
couraging vengeance, preventing unseemly brawls, and providing
time for mediation and reflection. Richards refrained from making
the challenge in the heat of passion, sought out the advice of a second,
and requested an amende honorable. Hollis and Meldrim took com-
plete charge of the matter, striving to find an adjustment while si-
multaneously protecting their principals' honor. Additional parties
tried to intervene and shape an adjustment through an inquiry and
fact-finding. Although the duel ended successfully in reconciliation,
the seconds and other friends failed to protect their principals from
the risks of an exchange of fire, albeit from inaccurate weapons.
As these historical examples illustrate, the guiding principles of
the early nineteenth-century American code duello promoted recon-
ciliation and reduced lethality. Seconds and other interveners served
crucial roles by conciliating and preserving the integrity of the proc-
ess while concurrently protecting the honor of their principal. The
ideal second would conciliate by using his personal skills to restrain
his principal, defuse anger, lower levels of hostility, and reframe per-
ceptions. He insured the integrity of the process by policing adher-
130 Id.
131 The adjustment provided:
I. Samuel B. Adams retract any insulting language to Mr. R. R. Richards in the
City Court where upon Mr. R. R. Richards allows the case of Ambrose and Puff
vs. Hudson and Sullivan to be reinstated by the City Court.
II. Mr. Samuel B. Adams apologizes for his language before the office of Cap-
tain McGowan to Mr. Richards.
ifi. Mr. Richards withdraws all imputation of falsity against Mr. Adams.
IV. Mr. Adams withdraws his motion against Mr. Richards in the Superior Court
and expresses his regrets therefore.
Signed,
P. W. Meldrim, Second for S. B. Adams
Edward C. Hollis, Second for R. R. Richards
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ence to the accepted norms of dueling and by negotiating terms of
engagement based on principles of fair play and a level playing field.
The rules themselves restrained the principals and seconds from act-
ing impulsively. The seconds protected the principals' honor by ne-
gotiating a carefully worded adjustment that would not admit pur-
poseful wrongdoing on the part of the challenged party while also
recognizing the legitimacy of the challenger's sense of being of-
fended. If such an adjustment could not be negotiated without com-
promise to a principal's honor, the seconds would provide unwaver-
ing support to their principals on the field, even to the extent of risk-
ing criminal prosecution and possibly their own lives. Intervention by
others seeking to achieve an adjustment was also an accepted con-
vention for promoting settlement. If a principal refused an objec-
tively fair adjustment, the second could force compromise by threat-
ening to leave his man unattended in the field. The examples also
illustrate, significantly, that the bar was no stranger to these princi-
ples.
III. APPLYING THE MODEL: THE ATrORNEY AS DUELIST'S FRIEND
This section of the Article explores the similarities between liti-
gation and dueling and how the seconds' model could be applied to
litigation. This section also discusses some of the limitations to the
model's application and analyzes how well it reconciles zealous ad-
vocacy with peacemaking.
A. Dueling as an Analogy to Civil Litigation
Litigation can be seen a form of dueling. Both litigation and du-
eling are methods of resolving disputes. Moreover, the sequence of
events in both processes is similar. The filing of a formal complaint
to initiate a civil action is equivalent to issuing the formal challenge
to duel.132 The responsive pleading is the formal reply of the party
receiving the challenge. The courtroom is the dueling ground, the
rules of civil procedure governing the trial are the terms of the en-
gagement, and the trial is the "combat" analogous to the duel itself.
(Given the nature of much modem litigation, it may not be an exag-
geration to describe it as a form of trial by combat.)
132 In late sixteenth-century France, the challenger, referred to as the "appellant" or "peti-
tioner" (demandeur), "calls" (appeler) the offender out to a duel. The opponent is the "called"
(appele) or the "defender." The call was preferably in writing, by cartel. See BILLAcoIs, supra
note 48, at 9 ("Just as in a civil court case one proceeds by issuing a writ to the parties who must
respond, so for combat (which we take to be a form of legal proceeding) one must call one's
enemy by a cartel on which the matter of the quarrel should be put as briefly as can be done.").
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The parties to the suit are the principals-duelists and their law-
yers are their seconds. Like seconds, lawyers are agents of the prin-
cipals. They become the primary conduits of communication, advis-
ing and guiding their clients through the process. They often serve as
surrogates in negotiation, bear responsibility for pursuing their cli-
ents' interests, and try to prevent the other side from gaining unfair
advantages.
Each discrete phase of trial-motions, voir dire, opening state-
ments, presentations of the evidence, rebuttal, and closings-are se-
quential exchanges of fire. The skill of the duelists and their surro-
gates influences the outcome, but, to a large extent, the outcome is out
of the duelists' and litigants' hands. As in dueling, the outcome of a
trial may not favor the aggrieved party, nor may it reflect the actual
facts underlying the dispute. 133
Litigation and dueling are also strikingly similar in their objec-
tives, both explicit and implicit, and in the procedures employed to
fulfill them. On the surface, the explicit objective of both litigation
and dueling as commonly understood, conceived, and depicted is the
same---dispute resolution through truth-finding.134  The explicit
"means" of both processes serve this explicit "end." Litigation ends a
dispute by following rules of civil procedure that lead to and define
conditions for an adversarial presentation. The process culminates in
an authoritative finding or independent determination of the truth
followed by an imposed judgment whereby the winner declares vindi-
cation. Dueling ends a dispute by following rules leading to and de-
fining conditions for controlled combat. The process culminates in
the injury or death of a party and "puts an end to the lie," whereby the
surviving or unscathed duelist has won and declares vindication for
his veracity and honor. Although litigation has a third-party umpire
and adjudicator, the divine judgment implicit in the outcome in duel-
ing hints at another ultimate adjudicator, as well.
Implicitly, the objectives of both processes are to avoid courts,
contain violence, and promote reconciliation. Like dueling, the ulti-
mate cost and risk of a final adjudication can discourage its use and
promote alternative means of resolution. In today's ADR-infused
legal system, the implicit objectives of litigation are arguably the
same as dueling-to divert civil cases into largely non-adjudicative
133 A duel is "a trial by strength taking the place of the legal form in the absence of a
common judgment... a trial which decides no more than a war who is right." Id. at 5.
134 This is an obvious simplification, and others may describe the explicit function or ob-
jective of civil litigation differently. However, both dueling and litigation are dependent on the
parties asserting a differing version of the facts, a differing opinion as to the applicable norms,
or a differing interpretation of the effect of the facts in light of the applicable norms.
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processes, contain violent self-help, avoid the imposition and en-
forcement of judgment (a form of state violence), and promote set-
tlement and even reconciliation if possible. ADR processes are the
means that serve the implicit ends of contemporary litigation and
were the means serving the implicit ends of dueling. As the historical
examples illustrate, the use of agents in negotiation, reconciliation,
mediation, fact-finding, and inquiry were as familiar to experienced
seconds as they should be to experienced litigators today.
B. Attorneys as Seconds in Civil Litigation
Attorneys and seconds are agents of their principals in processes
that have similar objectives. Each has to balance an appropriate level
of zeal in advocacy with the cooperative behavior required for
peacemaking. This section describes how attorneys might behave if
attorneys adopted the seconds' model as a way to achieve this bal-
ance.
1. Entering into the Relationship
Under this model, the potential client must adhere to two simple
rules-do not aggravate the situation 35 and do not formally assert a
claim before consulting the lawyer.136 Lawyers, for their part, must
establish their independence from potential clients before accepting
the position. 137 Once the representation is undertaken, the client must
clearly understand that his attorney will not blindly do his bidding,
and the attorney must establish enough objective distance from his
client to be a credible conciliator and to provide objective advice.
Furthermore, the code duello requires the client to relinquish the en-
tire matter to the attorney and not discuss it with the attorney unless
135 See WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 11 ("Whenever you believe that you are insulted,..
never resent it there ...."); see also id- at 32-33 (regarding the extent to which intoxication
may mollify the severity of the insult).
13 See id at 12 ("Never send a challenge in the first instance, for that precludes all nego-
tiation.... When you believe yourself aggrieved, be silent on the subject, speak to no one about
the matter, and see your friend, who is to act for you, as soon as possible.").
137 See it at 13 ("Whenever you are applied to by a friend to act as his second, before you
agree to do so, state distinctly to your principal that you will be governed only by your own
judgment .... ).
Canon 5 of the MODEL CODE promotes the exercise of "independent professional
judgment;" the accompanying ethical considerations and disciplinary rules, however, focus on
conflict of interest problems. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5
(1983). Ethical Consideration 2-30 implies that one should decline employment when personal
feelings may interfere. See idU EC 2-30. Note that this is different from the concerns of the
code duello-where the MODEL CODE focuses on preventing interests other than those of the
client from influencing the attorney, the code duello prohibits the principal's interests and emo-
tions from unduly influencing the second.
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the attorney initiates the discussion. 138 So long as the client defers to
the attorney's judgment, the attorney can retain the position. No at-
torney can take on a client who is unwilling to at least listen to advice.
Also, the attorney must terminate the relationship if his client refuses
to act in accordance with what the attorney believes is fair or to fol-
low the attorney's advice. Under the code duello, seconds could not
support their principals on the dueling ground when the matter was
inappropriate for dueling. When the client's cause is doubtful, attor-
neys must provide objective reality-testing to encourage resolution
and to discourage potentially more costly courses of action like liti-
gation. If litigation would be inappropriate even after attempting
resolution, an attorney should counsel the client in alternative ways to
resolve the matter but should not offer to represent the client in litiga-
tion. Every person should have access to counsel, but not every cause
deserves advocacy.
2. Attempting Reconciliation
Like seconds, attorneys negotiate settlements. 139 Under the code
duello, however, reconciliation would be the attorney's primary ob-
jective. 4° Reconciliation has only recently entered the lawyer's lexi-
con, 141 but if it were to become the attorney's primary goal, behaviors
associated with Rambo litigation tactics would be unacceptable to the
extent they undermine it.
Under the code duello, attempts at reconciliation should be made
even before the issuing of the challenge. By analogy, attempts at le-
gal settlements should occur before formally filing suit. Issuing a
premature challenge to duel not only may anger the other side but
also makes it more difficult for the other side to quietly apologize or
explain their words or actions and still save face. 142 Similarly, the
filing of a lawsuit without any prior communication between the par-
138 See WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 12 ("When your second is in full possession of the
facts, leave the whole matter to his judgment, and avoid any consultation with him unless he
seeks it. He has the custody of your honor, and by obeying him you cannot be compromitted
[sic]."). See supra Part II.B.2, for a discussion about how this can trigger tension between client
and lawyer over objectives and means.
139 See KIERNAN, supra note 48, at 139 (noting the resemblance of seconds to "lawyers
negotiating such a matter as a marriage contract," which reflected the intense legalism that
typified Europe at that time).
'40 The terms reconciliation and settlement are conflated for the purposes of this discus-
sion, even though the terms are not entirely synonymous-the former implying a resumption of
friendly relations. See YARN, supra note 21, at 375.
141 See GA. COMP. R. & REG. Part IX, A Lawyer's Creed (2000) ("To the opposing
parties and their counsel, I offer fairness, integrity, and civility. I will seek reconcilia-
tion.").
142 See BALDICK, supra note 52, for an example of a challenge letter, "which left
little scope for peace-making."
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ties both aggravates the situation and puts the respondent immediately
on the defensive. Unless the statute of limitations is about to run or
the other side cannot be found for communication, there is no reason
to file suit before giving the other side an opportunity to ameliorate
the situation.
Like the seconds in the Lincoln-Shields duel, the attorneys for
both sides should meet promptly after engagement by the clients and
pledge themselves to settle the matter.143 Opportunities for both sides
to save face and to adjust their competing positions become rarer as
time passes and clients become more entrenched and invested in the
adversarial process. If clients consult their attorneys early in a dis-
pute, damages may be lessened and there may be more flexibility in
constructing the terms of a settlement.
Often settlement is not possible without adjusting the perceptions
of the client and taking the other side's interests and perceptions into
account.144 Under the code duello, the attorney as counselor should
de-escalate the conflict by helping the client get control over emo-
tions and provide objective perspectives on the perceived wrong.
Settlement negotiations should be sensitive to the needs and interests
of the other side and done so as to preserve face. 45 The code duello
advises not to overreach on seeking an amende honorable. Similarly,
an attorney may cause negotiations to fail by making unreasonable
demands. All communications should be respectful and sensitive to
the other side's emotions. Settlement is impeded by insults, real or
perceived.
One method of settlement in dueling is for the seconds to meet
together in an effort to compose an adjustment. While much lawyer-
to-lawyer negotiation consists of positional bargaining in the context
of what a judge or jury might decide if the matter is not settled, the
code duello implies an objective, collaborative attempt to arrive at a
mutually acceptable compromise. 46  Like seconds, the attorneys
143 If a party is not represented, this model is less useful because it relies on two seconds
working together to achieve reconciliation. Nevertheless, the basic principles could still apply,
and the single second could serve as a mediating influence as exemplified by Dr. Bibb in the
Dooly-Tait duel. See supra Part H.C.2.
144 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETrNG TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 26-27 (1981).
141 See Jeffrey Rubin, Negotiation: An Introduction to Some Issues and Themes, 27 AM.
BEHAVIORAL SCIEnTIST 135, 138-44 (1983) (discussing that concessions are more easily made
when the negotiator feels the choice was made on the basis of his own competence as a nego-
tiator rather as a result of force).
146 Under the code duello, principals do not directly participate in the reconciliation efforts.
Although the current wisdom in ADR seems to be that negotiations are more effective with the
participation of the disputants, there are instances when face-to-face interaction by disputants
only exacerbates the situation. The code duello suggests a form of negotiation by proxy more
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could conduct an inquiry and issue a joint statement containing find-
ings of fact and recommendations for settlement. They could invite
other members of the bar or prominent members of the community to
form a commission of inquiry and issue recommendations for settle-
ment.147 They could legitimately threaten to abandon their client if
the client refuses to accept an objectively acceptable recommenda-
tion.
3. Pursuing Litigation
If efforts at reconciliation failed, seconds were entrusted to re-
duce the possibility that their principals would die on the dueling
ground. They negotiated terms of engagement that would not give
one party an advantage over the other. Similarly, attorneys should do
all they can to reduce the costs, psychological as well as economic, of
litigation. They could negotiate plans for pleading, discovery, mo-
tions, and trial that reduce costs and shorten the length of litigation.
They must insist upon adherence to the rules, deplore foul play, and
guard against ambush to ensure a level playing field. If one or the
other side is severely "wounded" by evidence uncovered in discovery
or presented at trial, both attorneys would have the obligation to in-
tervene and seek to bring the matter to an end to avoid further ex-
pense to both sides.
Like seconds on the dueling ground, attorneys must be staunch
supporters and representatives of their clients and their clients' causes
throughout litigation and trial. Concurrently, they would have a duty
to seek reconciliation in a dispassionate, objective spirit. They should
control or at least monitor communications so that pleadings and
other written and oral communications do not provoke the other side
or exacerbate the conflict.
4. Posting
What if the opposing party and its attorney not only refuse to
proceed under this model but fail to adhere to common rules of fair-
ness? Under the code duello, a principal could refuse to duel with
someone who violated the rules. The second could make public no-
closely resembling ancient arbitrement. See WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 21-22 (describing
the negotiation process). See also YARN, supra note 21, at 36, for a definition of arbitrement.
147 In many courts, the bar (and often laypersons) serve on mandatory, non-binding arbi-
tration panels. The purpose of this process is to encourage settlement among the parties. The
award is supposed to approximate a probable jury verdict in which one party wins and the other
loses. In contrast, recommendations from a commission of inquiry can propose complex, inte-
grative solutions designed to satisfy both parties. The proposals can be accompanied by reasons
explaining why the parties should find them acceptable.
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tice of the offender's ungentlemanly conduct so that others would be
warned not to extend the honor of dueling to this dishonorable person.
What if lawyers could "post" the names and offending behavior
of lawyers and disputants whom they feel have exceeded the bounds
of acceptable behavior in negotiation and litigation? 148 Using this
model, an attorney could put other attorneys on notice that a particu-
lar client or lawyer does not adhere to the rules of fair play. Although
the client and attorney cannot refuse to litigate in the same way that a
principal can refuse to duel with those who abuse dueling norms, the
mere threat of posting may promote cooperative behavior consistent
with the second's model. If parties and their attorneys fail to con-
form, by refusing to discuss settlement or making impossible de-
mands, by using unnecessarily inflammatory language in their com-
munications and pleadings, or by abusing discovery and other pre-
trial procedures simply to delay trial and raise the costs of litigation,
an attorney conforming to the seconds' model could post the offend-
ers in the local legal organ, in bar publications, or at the courthouse.
C. Problems and Possibilities in Applying the Model
There are a number of possible problems in using the code du-
ello as a model for lawyering. Of primary concern is whether the cur-
rent standards of professional conduct prohibit using certain aspects
of the seconds' model. There appears to be little tension between the
seconds' model and the requirement of zeal in advocacy. Seconds
should not compromise their principal's honor just as attorneys
should not compromise their client's rights. The seconds' model de-
mands no less zeal in asserting the client's position at trial or in pur-
suing the client's interests through negotiation. It does limit Rambo
litigation behavior, which undermines the possibility of settlement,
but such a limitation does not necessarily offend the requirement of
zeal.1
49
One area of tension between professional standards and the sec-
onds' model is strategic control. The code duelio requires the princi-
pal to defer to the second on all matters; 15" under professional stan-
dards, however, the client retains considerable control, certainly over
148 Analogies can be found on interet auction sites where purchasers rely very heavily on
trusting unknown sellers. Bidders can access evaluations of the seller made by previous pur-
chasers. Positive and negative comments are tallied underthe seller's name.
149 See supra notes 8, 12 and accompanying text, for the limitations on zeal provided by
professional standards.
150 See supra note 138.
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objectives and arguably over choice of strategy. 151 This tension may
be more illusory than real as neither the professional standards nor the
code duello prohibit an attorney or a second from consulting with the
client or principal as to objectives and matters of strategy. As a prac-
tical matter, attorneys can have considerable influence in the framing
of objectives and choice of strategy when discussing employment or
counseling the client. In addition, professional standards allow the
attorney and client to agree ex ante on the allocation of responsibility
over strategy. 152 If the client will not agree at the onset of the rela-
tionship to acceptable objectives 153 and an allocation of strategic
151 The MODEL RULES recognize a distinction between objectives and means, wherein the
lawyer must abide by the client's choice of objectives but need only consult with the client
regarding the means to achieve them. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.2(a) (1999). The MODEL RULES also provide that a lawyer does not have to "employ means
simply because a client may wish that the lawyer do so;" however, it recognizes that the distinc-
tion may sometimes be difficult to draw. Id. Rule 1.2 cmt. 1. The choice of means may have a
substantial impact on the objectives sought. Accordingly, the comment attempts to resolve such
problems by stating that when means are in question "the lawyer should assume responsibility
for technical and legal tactical issues, but should defer to the client regarding such questions as
the expense to be incurred." Id.
In contrast, the MODEL CODE does not so clearly distinguish objectives and means. It
cautions that "[a] lawyer shall not intentionally: (1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his
client through reasonably available means permitted by law." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A) (1983). A lawyer is allowed, however, to avoid "offensive tac-
tics." Il DR 7-101(A)(1). Moreover, "a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his own" if the
decision does not affect the merits of the case or substantially prejudice the client's rights. Ua.
EC 7-7. But the ultimate decision "whether to forego legally available objectives or methods
because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client." Id. EC 7-8.
The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS draws no distinction
between objectives and means. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 32(2) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992). The RESTATEMENT further provides that the lawyer is
bound to follow the client's instruction during representation if consistent with the RE-
STATEMENT and any agreement between lawyer and client. See id
'52 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. 4 (1999) ("The objec-
tives or scope of services provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client...
."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 151, § 32 (referring
to representation as consistent with "a valid agreement" between lawyer and client).
153 Certain objectives are recognized as a bar to employment. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSlBILrrY DR 2-109(A) (1983) (prohibiting lawyers from accepting em-
ployment if the client's objective is merely to harass or maliciously injure another or if the claim
is frivolous); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. 2 (1999) (same). An
illegal objective is barred, of course. See id. Rule 1.16 (a)(1).
Additional guidance on acceptable litigation objectives can be derived from John Cal-
vin's advice to Christians engaged in litigation. Calvin counseled:
[J]udicial processes are lawful to those who use them rightly; and that the right use.
.. is this: ... if the plaintiff.., states his complaint.., without any desire of injury
or revenge, without any asperity or hatred, without any ardour for contention, but
rather prepared to waive his right, and to sustain some disadvantage, than to cherish
emnity against his adversary... On the contrary, when their minds are filled with
malevolence, corrupted with envy, incensed with wrath, stimulated with revenge, or
inflamed with the fervor of contention, so as to diminish their charity, all the pro-
ceedings of the justest cause are inevitably wicked. For it ought to be an established
maxim with all Christians, that however just a cause may be, no lawsuit can ever be
carried on in a proper manner by any man, who does not feel as much benevolence
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powers consistent with lawyering under the seconds' model, the law-
yer does not have to accept the engagement. 154 If, after the lawyer
accepts employment, the client decides to pursue unacceptable objec-
tives and insists on strategic choices contrary to advice or the en-
gagement agreement, withdrawal becomes an option.
155
The issue of withdrawal also creates tension with professional
standards of conduct. Under the code duello and as illustrated by the
Lincoln-Shields duel, seconds could threaten to and even abandon
their principals on the dueling ground. In contrast, lawyers are lim-
ited in their right to withdraw, particularly when the matter is in liti-
gation.156 Again, this could be resolved to some extent through the
and affection towards his adversary, as if the business in dispute had already been
settled and terminated by an amicable adjustment. Some, perhaps, will object, that
such moderation in lawsuits is far from being ever practised [sic], and that if one in-
stance of it were to be found, it would be regarded as a prodigy. I confess, indeed,
that, in the corruption of these times, the example of an upright litigator is very rare;
but the thing itself ceases not to be good and pure, if it be not defiled by an adventi-
tious evil ....
2 JOHN CALVIN, THE INSrnrums OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 792 (John Allen trans. &
ed., 7th ed. 1936) (1536). Calvin continued:
It is certainly incumbent on Christians, in all cases, to prefer a concession of their
right to an entrance on a lawsuit; from which they can scarcely come out without a
mind exasperated and inflamed with enmity to their brother. But when one sees
that, without any breach of charity, he may defend his property, the loss of which
would be a serious injury to him; if he do it, he commits no offense .... [C]harity
will give everyone the best counsel; for, whatever litigations are undertaken without
charity, or are carried to a degree inconsistent with it, we conclude them, beyond all
controversy, to be unjust and wicked.
Id. at 795.
m See WILSON CODE, supra note 1, at 13 ("Whenever you are applied to by a friend to act
as his second, before you agree to do so, state distinctly to your principal that you will be gov-
erned by your own judgment... '). See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIIrIY
EC 2-26 (1983) ("A lawyer is under no obligation to act as advisor or advocate for every person
who may wish to become his client."). Although there are limits to this right to refuse employ-
ment, disagreement with the client's objectives and strategies is not among them. See id. EC 2-
26 to 2-30 (encouraging acceptance of employment with clients who "may be unattractive to
him and the bar generally").
155 Withdrawal can be mandatory as well as permissive. See MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (1983) (discouraging withdrawal in the majority of cases
by severely limiting lawyers' opportunities for mandatory and permissive withdrawal); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 1.16(a)-(b) (1999) (allowing the lawyer to withdraw if
the client insists on pursuing an objective the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent, or if the
client refuses to abide by an agreement concerning representation).
156 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsBmLrY DR 2-1 10(A)(2) (1983) (requir-
ing the lawyer to protect the client's rights from foreseeable prejudice before withdrawal);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.16(b) (1999) (allowing withdrawal so long
as it does not have a materially adverse effect on the client's interests). Under either set of
model standards, withdrawal is dependent on permission of the court. If the disagreement be-
tween lawyer and client is over strategy, the MODEL CODE is fairly restrictive by allowing with-
drawal only if the client insists "that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or
prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESpoNSIBmIY DR
2-110(C)(1)(c) (1983). The MODEL RULES provide a broader right of withdrawal by allowing
the lawyer to withdraw even if it has a materially adverse effect on the client, if the client insists
on a repugnant or imprudent objective, but not a repugnant or imprudent strategy. See MODEL
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use of ex ante agreements giving the attorney more power to with-
draw. Such an agreement would cause few problems if withdrawal
occurred before commencing litigation, but withdrawal after the
commencement of litigation or during trial itself would raise prob-
lems. Unlike the settlement counsel or collaborative lawyering mod-
els, 157 the seconds' model does not require an attorney to withdraw if
settlement efforts fail or one of the parties commences litigation. The
seconds' model requires the attorney to advocate as well as collabo-
rate. As seconds, attorneys must function on a dual track-doggedly
pursuing settlement while staunchly supporting and zealously advo-
cating for the client in litigation. Unlike the settlement counsel
model, disputants do not have to hire two attorneys to pursue both
tracks.
Another criticism of the settlement counsel and collaborative
lawyering models could be leveled at the seconds' model. Both of
*those models require the other side to adopt the same model. During
the golden age of dueling, one could duel only with someone of the
same class and seconds had to be from the same social class. 158 Al-
though far from elitist, the contemporary models work only if both
sides are pursuing the process under the same rules and with other
settlement counsel or collaborative lawyers representing them. Col-
laborative lawyering is working only in geographical areas or sub-
disciplines where relatively large and committed groups of lawyers
have formed organizational structures that support the process. 59
Like the old lawyer joke in which one lawyer in a town starves but
two thrive, there have to be at least two collaborative lawyers for the
process to work.
Arguably, the seconds' model suffers under a similar limitation
because it works best if both attorneys and their clients understand
and agree to the norms inherent in the model. Some procedures, such
as a joint inquiry and recommendations for settlement, do require the
cooperation of the other side's attorney. Nevertheless, the seconds'
model is more a philosophy of representation than a process, allowing
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.16(b)(3) (1999). The RESTATEMENT seems to allow
withdrawal for strategy disagreements if the action directed by the client is "so harmful to the
client or others that the lawyer cannot in good conscience . . . assist in its pursuit." RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 151, § 44 cmt. h.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 31-47.
159 See IRISH CODE, supra note 71, at 41 ("Seconds to be of equal rank in society with the
principals they attend, inasmuch as a second may choose or chance to become a principal, and
equality is indispensable.").159 Although there are experiments elsewhere and the concept is growing, most collabora-
tive lawyering is centered in Cincinnati, Ohio, home of the Collaborative Law Institute, a mem-
bership organization, and among divorce lawyers under the Family Law Project of the Collabo-
rative Law Institute. See Rack, supra note 41, at 8.
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one to adhere to the seconds' model independent of the other side. A
lawyer can provide objective counsel, pursue settlement, insist on fair
play, protect the client's rights, and zealously assert the client's posi-
tion even if the other side does not use the model, whereas a lawyer
can only be a collaborative lawyer if the other side agrees to the col-
laborative lawyering process.
The seconds' model may also be incompatible with existing
monetary and non-monetary incentives. Parties using litigation for
strategic business purposes or to delay resolution of disputes are less
likely to want attorneys who favor settlement and efficient litigation
under the seconds' model. Moreover, it is not altogether clear how
current methods of compensating lawyers for their services would
have to be altered for the seconds' model to work today. The rela-
tively positive acceptance of ADR by business, government, and the
bench and bar, however, indicates that it may be possible to adapt the
conciliatory functions embodied in the model to current economic
realities.
Through the mechanism of posting, the seconds' model discour-
ages behavior that undermines settlement and raises litigation costs.
Several possible problems with adopting the practice of posting must
be addressed. First, one might ask whether posting conflicts with or
duplicates existing disciplinary systems. The bar has a disciplinary
system for violations of certain standards, and the courts have disci-
plinary powers over litigants and their representatives. But neither of
these systems accomplishes the same objective as posting. Bar disci-
pline systems react only to a limited set of prohibited behaviors (the
most common of these being commingling of funds and client aban-
donment), most of which are unrelated to the more aspirational norms
embodied in the seconds' model. Although some disciplinary actions
are published, most take the form of private reprimands. Trial courts
may punish certain abuses of the litigation process, but it is only the
rare case that becomes broadly known among the bar, particularly in
large communities. These systems of discipline fail to sufficiently
publicize offenses or react to violations of many norms embodied in
the code duello and seconds' model.
Second, there is the possibility that posting could be abused.
One can imagine a nightmare of posting and counter-posting, or so
much indiscriminate posting that most everyone gets posted and no
one takes the practice seriously. An effective system of posting may
have to be formalized and regulated in some way to be taken seri-
ously. The role of libel and slander law in posting would also have to
be examined.
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Third, it is possible that posting would not actually deter unde-
sirable conduct. The reality is that lawyers post other lawyers every-
day through word-of-mouth and similar means. This informal system
of posting is unlikely to deter conduct if the offender is unaware of
the norms being applied or of the effect on reputation. In addition,
the importance of reputation among one's peers may vary. Game
theory suggests that reputation is more important in smaller legal
communities where lawyers anticipate repeated encounters and where
the actions of individuals can be well publicized. 160  A formalized
system of posting independent of other disciplinary systems provides
an opportunity to articulate the favored norms and make the offender
aware that his conduct will affect reputation. An effective system of
posting would have to reach those lawyers who are likely to encoun-
ter the offender in the future.
CONCLUSION
An examination of the now-archaic code duello provides insight
into two modem problems-the social efficacy of litigation and the
role of attorneys in the resolution of disputes. While there are aspects
of the code duello that offend modem sensibilities, there are other
aspects of the practice that can serve as guiding principles for the
resolution of disputes. On the surface, dueling was a violent, archaic
ritual that relied on seemingly irrational social conventions that are
almost impossible to imagine today. Under the surface, it was a very
rational method of managing disputes in an elite society lacking ac-
ceptable alternatives to unrestrained violence. Similarly, litigation
appears to be a costly, archaic ritual often relying on seemingly irra-
tional social conventions that may be impossible for some future gen-
eration to imagine. Under the surface, however, it increasingly at-
tempts to divert disputes towards less costly methods of dispute
resolution. The success of this effort largely depends on attorneys
adopting more appropriate roles and adapting their behavior, serving
more as seconds than as surrogate combatants. Under the seconds'
160 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 3, at 565. Iterated prisoner's dilemma games show
that expectation of repeated encounters will produce cooperative behavior and deter abusive
behaviors. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1994) (de-
scribing Rich Riolo's computer simulation game). Ultimately with respect to fair dealing, law-
yers should be restrained by pressure to maintain credibility with their peers, who are likely to
be distrustful in negotiation and more wary in litigation with attorneys who previously lied or
engaged in abusive litigation tactics. Over time, a lawyer's reputation for truthfulness, honesty,
and fairness should make him a more effective negotiator in repeat encounters. As the profes-
sion's size and anonymity increases in an ever-growing society concentrated in large urban
areas, the expectation of repeat encounters diminishes, perhaps explaining the stereotypes of
uncooperative behavior by urban lawyers (the "Philadelphia attorney") contrasted to the coop-
erative behavior of small-town and "country" lawyers.
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model, there is no need to choose between being a conciliator or zeal-
ous advocate.
A fencing master once said, "It is not the sword or the pistol that
kills, but the seconds. ' 6 ' In dueling, bad seconds were potentially
lethal, but good seconds could avoid injury and reconcile the dispu-
tants. In the contemporary context, it is not the court's judgment or
order that brings ruin, but the attorneys. In legal disputes, bad attor-
neys can cause the client to incur considerable costs, win or lose, but
good attorneys reduce the risks and cost of litigation and facilitate
settlement. The historical precedent of code duellos illustrates how
good attorneys can serve both clients and society better in the role of
the duelist's "friend."
161 BALDICK, supra note 52, at 38.
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